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TIns paper im1eJtigateJ dlflicultieJ in meaJuring reJer7)ation wageJ, modelr the determinantJ ~f 
reJeroation and wmpareJ re.rer7Jation wageJ llli!h predicted 2llageJ. Data iJ drawn frvm the 
Khqyeii!Jha/JVlitcheii'j' Plain {KiHPj .rUrlJ(!}. Certain/atton (e.g. education, labour market xtatUJ, 
hotmhold income and duration ~f unemplV'mentj are .fignijicant in e:plaining lx/riation in 
reJervation lmport,mt/y, a penon'.rpoJt'iion in labotlr market ix not a.r a nftllt of hiJ/ her 
reJeroation wage. Rather, reJeroation 21lageJ are a /undion o/htJ-/ her labour market .rtatUJ: while 
tiJoJe in wage-emplq)'mel't report a reJer7)ation wage ba.red more on perceived labour market value, 
thoJe ill tmemp/~yment reIort a reJer7Jation JJJage influenced Jtrongjy ty mbJi.rtence requirementJ. Tbts 
Jtuc[y conciudeJ that l!olun/ary lIflemplV'ment doeJ not e.yiJt in KJVIP, with people il1 general reporting 
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The depth of pm'erty al,d inequality faced in South Africa is amongst the worst in the world, 
with about 24 million South Africans, out of a total population of 45 million, living below 
the ponrty line l (t--kCord, 2002). Numerous studies (e.g. Leibbrandt, Bhorat & Woolard 
(2001), Nattrass & Seekmgs (2001) and van der Berg & Bhorat (1999» have shown that 
there is a strong link between poverty, inequality and the labour market in South Africa. In 
particular the availability and level of wage income in the household determines the 
household's position in the income distribution. Although evidence has shown that the level 
of \vage income determ:nes the probability of a household being in pm'erty or not, a more 
important and crucial factor is the presence of a wage earner in a household. Leibbrandt, 
Bhorat and Woolard (2()01 :81) have shown that 76.1 % of those people who live in poverty 
are in households that ha\'e no formal sector wage earners. GiYen that even low paying jobs 
can ha,'e a substantial impact on allcviating poverty, onc would expect people living in an 
area of high unemployment and related economic hardship, to accept almost any job 
opportunity. 
Hmvever, looking at th..: Khayelitsha/Mitchell's Plain (I(MP) survey of 2000 (Centre for 
Social Science Research, 2000), where respondents responded to questions concerning 
hypothetical job offers, about 15% of the sample refused the offers. These jobs offered 
wages realistic to I,""\lP and adjacent areas at the time of the survey. How could people 
refuse jobs given the high levels of unemployment and the lack of job opportunities, 
especially for those with few skills? How could they refuse offers in light of the evidence 
showing that a household's position in the income distribution is st.rongly influenced by the 
availability of wage income? Perhaps people do ha\'e a reSelYation wage even in the presence 
of large unemploymem and poverty. Perhaps certain individuals are choosing to remain 
yoluntarily unemployed. Perhaps reservation wage information still matters in dictating 
labour supply and participation decisions in South Africa and I,""\IP more specifically. 
Using data from the K.\IP survey, this paper will explore resen'atioll wages. The survey was 
dcYclopcd with a speci:tl focus on labour market issues and coyered the magisterial district of 
;\Iitchell's Plain, which includes the A.frican townships of Khayelitsha, Gugulethu and Langa. 










area but of predominantly working class Africans and Coloureds. The households that were 
sampled had to answer both a household lC\Tel questionnaire and an adult questionnairc2• 
The household questionnaire was to establish a household roster with the usual 
questions on age, gender and relationships in the household (Centre for Social Science 
Research, 2003). The adult questionnaire was administered to all those aboye the age of 18 in 
the household and was diyided into sections measuring aspects from a respondent's level of 
education to their unemployment and employment histories etc. One section (section K) was 
designed specifically to tneasure a respondent's reserYation wage, i.e. to establish the lowest 
wage at which the person would work. 
The aims of this paper are to understand the complexities in measuring reservation wages 
using data from the IoC1\fP sU1Tey. Through regression analysis, the paper will probe what 
factors (individual, household, situational etc.) influence a person's reservation wage in 
IoC1\lP. An understanding of the determinants of reservation wages should help predict and 
explain changes in labour supply. This paper also looks at the relationship between a 
respondent's predicted \\'age and his/her reserYation wage in an attempt to distinguish 
groups people whose resen'ation is excessive relatiye to what they could earn given 
their characteristics. 
Section 2 begins with a Giscussion of what constitutes an individual's resen'ation wage. 
Included in this discussion is a theoretical ovclTiew of different \'alue functions that pertain 
to different labour market states. These value functions will provide guidance as to what 
factors are likely to in1pact on a person's reservation wage. 
Section 3 probes the important question of whether economic behaviour follows reported 
resen'ation wages. Much of this discussion will focus on work done internationally as there 
has been little work done in this regard in South Africa. I\luch of the South African work has 
been concerned with the problems in measuring resen'ation \vages through surveys, as will 
be discussed. 
Section 4 looks carefully at the questions 
they measure reservation wages. Has this 
in the KMP sun'ey and probes how reliably 
managed to O\'ercome the problems of 
: Here the poverty line is calculated on the basis of household consumption expenditure of R800 or less per month in 
1996 prices. 











other sWTeys? Can the measured reservation wages be considered reliable and consistent? Is 
economic behaviour consistent with these reservation wages? 
Section 5 uses regression analysis to probe what factors determine a person's reservation 
wage, The discussion begins by looking at the model specification and includes a description 
of the explanatory \'ariables used in light of the value functions described in section 2 and 
the analysis in section 4 
Section 6 compares respondents predicted and reservation wages to assess whether there is 
an argument for the existence oflarge-scale "voluntary" unemployment in Kl.lP. Predicted 
wages are estimated using the Heckman maximum likelihood method. A probit analysis is 
then conducted to anal;'se what groups of people are most likely to have a reservation wage 
higher than their predicted wage (i.e. overly optimistic wage expectations). 











2. Reservation Wages 
Killingsworth (1983) detines a person's reservation wage as the highest wage at which 
he/ she will not work. l\lore formally, it is the slope of the budget line tangent to the 
individual's utility function, when aU of his/her time is dedicated to leisure activities (for a 
complete discussion of this see Killingsworth, 1983). Thus if the wage drops below this 
leyel, changes in the wage will not change behaviour. If the wage increases aboye this level 
then the person will enter the labour market. At his or her reSelYation wage a person is 
indifferent between work and leisure. However, if a person's property income (other income 
derh'ed from sources that are unrelated to work) rises or falls, so does their reservation wage. 
Killingsworth (1983:8) notes that, "other things being equal, people with less property 
income cannot 'afford' to be choosy about working and will have to be prepared to work for 
a lower wage." 
In terms of the I(j\fP survey, a person's reservation wage is the point at which he/she will 
participate in any form cJ wage-employment assuming they were unemployed at the time. 
Thus knowing each person's reservation wage, one will better understand labour supply in 
Kl\fP. the point at which people participate in the labour market is their reservation 
wage, knowing the determinants of reservation wages one \vill be able to predict and 
interpret changes in labour supply. Other sources of income affect the reselTation \vage but 
so will the shape and position of the particular utility function, which is a portrayal of the 
individual's work/leisure trade-off. As discussed below, the \-alue people derive from being 
in different labour market states determines the interaction between their non-wage income 
and their work/leisure trade-off. 
following Sapsford and [zannatos (1993), it is assumed that prior to searching for a Job, an 
individual decides on the minimum acceptable wage that he/ she will work for. If this 
minimum acceptable wage is higher than the value of the income associated with the 
individual's present situa cion then he/ she begins the process of search and only stops once a 
wage offer equal to or greater than the reservation wage is found. Thus, resen-ation wages 
are an important component of the search theory model that describes an individual's 
process of looking for a Job. People formulate their reservation wage by taking into account 
a comparison of different value functions which describe the present discounted value of 











Sapsford & Tzannatos note that "it is frequently assumed that the indiyidual, haying 
accepted this offer, remains in employment forever, 111 which case it is convenient to 
interpret the wage offer as the discounted present value of the lifetime earnings from the job 
in question" (1993:339). In an area likc I<lvIP, pcoplc will probably have short time horizons 
given thc high uncmplo\'mcnt and unpredictable nature of employment duration. In addition 
people in lZi\IP are notlble to move freely betwecn states when they wish due to the 
shortage of a"\'ailable jobs. Therefore, it would be unrealistic to model their value functions 
in a dynamic way whcre they discount the prcsent value of being in a particular state. Rather 
the value of each state will be analysed in a static sense, \vhere only the current value is 
measured. For example, the value of being employed as opposed to being unemployed and 
searching for work or being unemployed and not searching for work. 
Following Dinkelman & Pirouz (2001:2) these \'alue functions can be represented as follows: 
1. 
2. 
= value of taking a job offer 
= W(j) - C(D 
WG) is the after tax wage rate from the job. C(D are the costs related to the job, 
which may include transport to work and the costs of putting children in childcare. 
For the purposes of this paper these costs are assumed to be the same for everyone 
in IZMP'. 
= value of search unemployment 
= 8(s) - C(s) 
Where B(s) are the expected benefits of search and C(s) are the costs of search. 
Moving beyond DinkeLman and Pirouz4, the benefits of search are equal to: 
3 In practice these costs are probably greater for women, as they are expected to look after the children, 
4 The specification of benefits of search, as presented in Dinkelman & Pirouz (200 I). have been changed here, to 
reflect that an individual's probability of finding a job and the expected wage rate are both dependant on x, a vector of 
the individuals characteristic" In Dinkelman & Pirouz (200 I) the probability of an indIVidual finding work is not 












Where Pi is the individual's probability of finding a job and E[wJ is the expected 
wage in that job, both dependant on x, the individual's characteristics (e.g. gender, 
age, race, educatIOn level etc.). Pi is also dependent on the macroeconomic climate 
and the preference of employers for labour. bsu is the amount of non-work 
(property) income available in searching unemployment depending on what 
resources the individual and household can draw on. These resources may include 
old-age pensiom, the child welfare grant and other state transfers. 
of search, C(s), will equal the sum of the cost associated with each search 
method pursued This will include transport costs, agency costs, media costs and the 
opportunity costs of queuwg and waiting. Once again, for the purposes of this paper 
it is assumed that these costs are the same for each individual in I<lvlP. 
= value of being out of the labour force in state i 
= B(o,i) - C(o,i) 
Where, for example, B(o,i) could be the benefits from being out of the labour force 
as a house worker, student, retired individual, or others. For a student these benefits 
would include the value of an improved qualification plus any other non-work 
(property) income that the individual or individual's household is able to draw on. 
C(o,i) are the related costs of state i, which would include the opportunity costs of 
not searching fOJ a job. These opportunity costs \vould vary depending on how the 
indiyidual would be expected to fare in the labour market given their individual 
characteristics (xl and the expected value and probability of them finding a job. 
When an individual sets a reservation wage it is an indication of his/her formulated value 
functions and at what point he/ she will mo're from being out of the labour force or in 
search unemployment and into formal employment. This mm'ement would happen when Vi 
exceeds both Vsu and Yo . 
5 Dinkelman & Pirouz (2001) irdicate, following a suggestion from Wittenberg (1999), that 'other' might involve 











Value functions are useful in that they indicate what factors are likely to impact on the 
resen'ation wage. Using \'alue functions provides a framework for narrowmg the list of 
explanatory variables used in the regression analysis in section 5. As the purpose of this 
paper is to understand the determinants of a person's reservation wage in Kl\fP, before they 
receIve any job offers, the costs eG) are irrelevant. Due to the lack of specific information 
regarding the costs C(s) l11d C(o,i), these costs are assumed to be the same for all people 
li-dng in Iv\IP and are also irrelevant for this study6. C(o,i) also includes the opportunity 
costs of not searching \vhich are related to the individual's probability and expected value 
getting a job. However, :lS [(P)(E[wJ)/x] improves so will the value of being in searching 
unemployment, which will lead to a rise in the reservation wage. As a result the person 
would mmTe into searchmg unemployment. Thus, B(s) and B(o,i) are relevant m determining 
a persons resen'ation w"ge. TIllS will be further explored in section 5 when the explanatory 
,'ariables in the regressic.n analysis are specified. 
() It is accepted that household" have different numbers of children, which may impact differently on individual value 
functions and thus on their rcs:rvation wage. However, as discussed in AppendIx B, the variable number of children 











3. Measuring Reservation Wages 
The notion of a reservation wage is simple conceptually, but difficult to measure in practice. 
Do real people actually have reservation wages, and if so, what affects them? Other equally 
pertinent questions include: 
• Do people report reservation wages that are consistent with the economist's 
theoretical understanding of a reservation wage? 
• Do people undet stand what a reservation wage . 
• In reporting their reservation wage, what assumptions arc people taking into 
account? 
• How closely is a person's present reservation wage related to his or her wage history? 
• \\1hat causes a p( rson's reservation wage to change? 
• Most importantl:·, is an individual's economic beha,"iour consistent with his/her 
reported reservation wage, for example with regard to labour market participation 
and refusal or acceptance of job offers? 
The discussion in this section begins by looking at some important international literature. 
I\Iuch of this work has been done in an environment that does not ha,"e the extremely high 
unemployment rates and poverty experienced in South Africa. As a result, caution must be 
exercised in drawing infl renee for the South African context. 
The discussion will then look at work done in SOUtll Africa specifically regarding the 
measurement of resenration wages. Most of this work is based on two sunreys that have 
attempted to measure re-;enration wages, the SALDRLJ (South African Labour and 
De,"elopment Research Unit) 1993 survey (S1\LDRU93) and the October Household Survey 
of 1994 (OHS94). In concluding, solutions will be offered to help improve future surveys of 
reservaUon in South Africa. Section 4 analyses the usefulness of the KMP data against 
this backdrop. 
3.1 International Work 
In an early econometric <lOalysis of reservation wages, Lancaster and Chesher (1983) found 











questions on reselTation wages. In addition, individuals reported reservation wages that were 
"numerically consistent" with optimal job search theory, where only 3 respondents of the 
sample of 642 reported an expected wage of less than the reservation wage. The expected 
wage in this instance is \yhat the respondents reported when asked what wage they expected 
to earn. 
Jones (1988) inwstigated the relationship between reservation \vages and a person's duration 
of unemployment. Using data on unemployed individuals in Great Britain, he found a 
positi"ve relationship, where reservation wages "playa significant" role in the determination 
of unemployment duration. This finding is in line with the theory of stationary job search, 
which asserts that, given other characteristics, an individual who has been unemployed for 
some time is likely to have a higher reservation wage than someone who has been 
unemployed for a shorter time. This is because no wage offer high enough has been made to 
induce the longer unemployed person into the labour force. From this evidence Jones (1988) 
concludes that the unemployed do act in accordance with their stated resen"atlon wage when 
evaluating prospective Job offers. Furthermore, Jones states that there is "considerable 
precedent in the economics literature for viewing such responses [to resenration wage 
questions] as indicative of labour market behaviour" (1988:749). 
Howe\"er, Jones (1988) does make note of a problem associated with his results and why 
they may not be applicable in a wider context. An Important point is the effect of 
unemployment benefits on a person's reservation wage. In a country where the 
unemployment benefits are exhaustible or non-existent, a person's reselTation wage may 
decline as the duration of unemployment persists. In Britain this would not have been so 
critical at the time of the study when unemployment benefits were not exhaustible. In South 
,\frica this may be a problem given the inadequate proVIsion of unemployment benefits7• A 
person may have a reselvation \vage to begin with and may act in accordance with this wage 
in enluating job offers. As the duration of unemployment persists and the related hardships 
of unemployment inten.:;ify (Leibbrandt, Bhorat & Woolard (2001), Nattrass & Seekings 
(2001) and \'an der Berg & Bhorat (1999») so may this resen'arion wage decline or economic 
behaviour dC'\~iate from this statcd reservation wage. As a rcsult a person's rescn'ation wage 
in one time period may not be an accurate prcdictor of economic beha\'iour with regards to 
labour supply in another time pcriod. 
7 The UIF (LJnemployment In,urance Fund) provides 26 weeks of income for those workers that contributed to the 











Particular studies in periods of high unemployment haye produced mixed results. As 
discussed in Jones (1988): Holzer (1985) finds the reported resen'ation wages to be a 
reasonable reflection of economic behaviour, whereas Moylan, Millar and Davies (1984) 
found inconsistencies wlth men accepting 
Testing the erosion of an individual's ,""'''PM''' 
below their reported reseITation wages. 
wage or his/her inconsistent behaviour as 
unemployment persists will only be possible when reliable panel data exists in South Africa. 
IIoweycr, to a limited extent, the Krv1P sUITey offcrs the possibility of assessing this~. 
Gorter and Gorter (199~)), using data derived from the Dutch Socio-economic panel of 
1985-87, conclude that the job offer arrival rate is more important than the unemployment 
benefit and rescn'ation wage in ending a search spelL They highlight that the personal 
productIvity of the searcher will affect the Job arrival rate. This finding is rather 
and inconclusi,'e. Does rhe productivity of the searcher not influence his/her B(s) (as 
specified in equation 2 in section 2) which impacts on his/her reservation wage - as 
discussed in section 2 when looking at value functions? If this is true then the reseITation 
wage in turn affects the offers that are acccptcd or rcjectcd. Thus, the resenration wage is 
important in determinin,s the length of search duration (i.e. economic behaviour) because it 
reflects the underlying perceived producti,rity of an individual and how earnestly they are 
prepared to wait for an appropriate offer. 
Prasad (2000) uses consecutive reseITation observations and accepted wages that can 
be compared to reservation wages from previous from the German socio-economic 
Panel (GSOEP) study, t'J examine whether reselvation wage data resemble a relationship to 
actual economic behaviour. The strength of this study is that it uses panel data, which 
accurately shows how a person's reseITation changes oyer time in relation to the 
offers accepted. By computing the differential between the accepted wage at time (t + 1) and 
the resen'ation wage at time (t) and plotting this as a percentage of the reseITation wage, 
Prasad (2000) shows that the majority of results cluster around zero. This strongly suggests 
that there is a relationshlp between reservation wage data and economic behaviour. 
Recent work by Boheim (2002) has looked at whether the reported reservation wage is an 
indicator of a persons 'tme' rcseITation wage 'tme' reservation wage being the minimum 
8 See section 4.2 and section 5. In section 5 a variable measuring unemployment duration is included as one of the 











wage that an individual would accept to participate in the labour market. Boheim (2002:18) 
concludes that, "men's reported reservation wages are an indicator of their "true" 
resen'ation wage." For women the outcome is not as indicative, but Bohein1 (2002) notes 
that the number of women in the sample is low, which may influence the results. 
In Boheim's paper, refer~nce is made to work done by Dawes (1993) and a study he 
conducted on long-term British unemployment. Dawes (1993) concluded that reported 
resen-ation wages could be misleading, as responses to resen'ation wage questions can 
"indicate subsistence requirements rather than self perceived labour market value" (2002:2). 
Although Boheim (2002:, criticises the Dawes study for using a particular sample of 
unemployed individuals, \vhere the conclusions may not be true for the population as a 
\vhole, it is important to keep these points in mind when analysing resen-ation wage data for 
South Africa. With the high levels of poverty and unemployment in South Africa, individuals 
may be strongly influenced to report reservation wages that indicate subsistence 
requirements rather than self-perceived labour market worth. The fmdings in section 5 
support Dawes's argument by showing a distinction between the reselyation wage of those 
in wage-employment and the reservation wage of the unemployed. The e\-idence seems to 
indicate that those in wase-employment report reservation wages that reflect their perceived 
labour market value, whereas the unemployed tend to consider subsistence requirements 
\vhen reporting their resenration wage. Dawes refers to reported res en-arion wages that 
consider subsistence req uirements as misleading. This is not the case as long as one is aware 
of this. There is important information to be garnered from resen-arion wages that reflect 
subsistence requirement;;. 
In summary, the internarional work seems to support the norion that reported res enTation 
wages arc a good predict or of economic behaviour but concern still arises over the high 
le,-e!s of unemployment in South Africa and how this may distort economic behaviour. For 
example, a person may report a particular resen'ation wage in time t, but as their duration of 
unemployment lengthens, their reservation \vage will fall (see section 5). Given this fall the 
person's economic beha \-iour in time t+ 1 will reflect the reduced resenrarion wage and not 
the reported resen'arion wage from time t. This erosion of the resenration wage will only be 











3.2 South African Work 
Surveys that haye attempted to measure an indiyidual's reservation wage in South Africa 
include the Si\LDRU93 survey, the OHS94 and the KMP survey used in this study. A major 
limiting factor of these surveys is that they are once off and thus no assessment can be made 
of how an indi,ridual's reservation wage changes mrer time. It is also not possible to compare 
the reported resenration wage to the wage histories of the respondents (although the I<lvIP 
sunrer tries to an extent to amend this) and as a result it is difficult to ascertain how reliably 
the resenration wages predict economic behaviour. Nonetheless, for the purpose at hand, the 
K"'IP sunrer prmrides good information for trying to understand what factors impact on a 
person's resenration wage. In addition, the I<lvIP survey measures the wages of those who 
are presently employed, as well as the wage offers refused and proyides information on 
hypothetical jobs where respondents were asked if they would accept the job or not at a 
specified wage. Section +.2 uses this information to test the reliability of the reported 
resen'ation \vage from the KJ\IP survey. 
Table 1 lists the questions from the SALDRU93 and OHS94 sunreys pertaining to 
resenration \vages. 
TABLE 1: 'Measuring Resen'ation Wages in the SALDRlJ93 & OHS94 Sunreys 
1. Southern .\t'rica Labour and Development Research Cnit, 1993 
2, Central Statistical Service. 1 '95 
Before moving on to discuss work that has used the results from the sunreys, it is worth 
commenting on the omissions and inconsistencies in the questions tIl table 1. The questions 
do not specify how many hours a respondent would be expected to work or how far from 











that the jobs mayor ma) not offer. At least the SALDRU93 surYeY makes a distinction 
between casual and permanent work which can have importance in assessing how job 
security is valued. This i~ not made clear in the OHS94 question. 
Kingdon and Knight (2(101) assess the difference between resen~ation wages and predicted 
wages as a possible route to understanding the nature of unemployment in South Africa 
using data from the So:\I DRU93 and OI-IS94 surveys. From the SALDRU93 survey, 
question 13 (see table 1) is used as the measure of a person's resen'ation wage. Kingdon and 
Knight point out that question 12 is not used, as it seems less reliable. Their reasoning is that 
by "standardising the reported daily reservation wage figure to the month by multiplying the 
daily rate by 25 gaye an average monthly reservation wage for casual jobs that was 45</0 
higher than the reported monthly wage for a permanent job" (2001:10). This reasoning fails 
to include the possibility that respondents were taking job security into account when 
reporting resen'ation wages for permanent employment and as a result were willing to accept 
lower wages. As a result the answers are possibly not less reliable but include more 
information than is noted. 
As both sun'eys failed to ask questions for past wages or wage offers rejected, Kingdon and 
I-(night generated predicted wages for the unemployed indiyiduals using parameters from the 
wage functions of employed persons. Kingdon and Knight's (2001) results show that about 
50% of the unemployed have a reservation wage that exceeds their predicted wage and for 
about 30% of the unemployed, this reservation wage exceeds the predicted wage by more 
than 40%. More specifically: African respondents, people from rural homelands, low-
educated workers, fem8les, the young and persons who ha\'e never worked before have a 
noticeably higher mean reservation wage ratio (reservation \vagel predicted wage). One may 
conclude that for the majority of the unemployed they are not reporting their reservation 
wage and would be prepared to work for less gi"en their predicted \vage. Thus, using this 
resen'ation wage to understand economic behaviour would be flawed. HOWe\Tr the 
reliability of the reservation wage measure has to be l1uestioned. 
Kingdon and Knight (2001) list numerous reasons why they suspect the reported reservation 
wages to be unreliable. One problem is that survey questions on resen'ation wages are often 
not specific enough and are open to wide interpretation. The lluestions in the SALDRU and 
OtIS sun'eys failed to "pecify the expected hours of work per \veek or month and also the 











'going wage' because such a wage depends on the job and the skills characteristics of the 
individual concerned. Secondly, people often report a fair wage and not necessarily the 
minimum they \vould accept in the formal sector. Thirdly, often people (especially in deep 
rural areas) lack information about the labour market and are unable to \'alue themseIYes 
correctly given the level of skills they possess. They also lack education and previous work 
experience, which causes them to be ignorant about their market worth. Fourthly, when 
asked about their reservation wage people may adopt a bargaining stance since this is the 
usual context 111 which they discuss wages. Thus, the wage they report is the one they would 
normally start bargaining \vith and is above their minimum acceptable wage. 
In addition, Jones (1988) discusses the notion that respondents may be concerned about the 
confidentiality of the survey and as a result have little incenti,'e to report honest answers. 
Finally, people may report a wage they expect to receive in an area other than where they 
presently reside. This is often the case with people living in rural areas, who aspire to find 
work in urban areas. Kingdon and Knight find tlnt these measuring problems contribute to 
the situation where the "reported reservation wage often exceeds the predicted wage" 
(2001: 14). 
In trying to improve the reliability of recording reported reservation wages, Dias offers the 
following suggestion of how to formulate a survey question: 
alfa ft/li-time job is qf1ered to ... name . .. near~)' (within 5 kilometm oj)otlr midence) would 
... name . . . ai't'ep! it if tiJe }})eek!), rale lvere: (with a range q/i!1(()me calegorieJ having been provided)?" 
(2000:18) 
Furthermore, Dias suggests that the interviewer "read each salary or wage bracket starting 
from the lowest and identify the first wage or salary bracket that the respondent would be 
willing to accept" (200(l:18). Hopefully this will prevent respondents from assuming a 
bargaining position when reporting their reservation wage and identify the lowest wage that 
an indiddual would be prepared to work for. As noted earlier with question 12 and 13 from 
the SALDRU93 suryey, Dias suggests that a question should be asked pertaining to the 
minimum wage that a respondent would accept for doing a casual job. This will help shed 
light on the extent to which "job security can be traded for income" (2000:18). Included in 











"past wages earned may well form a reasonable benchmark for wage expectations while past 
wage offers rejected may substantiate the reservation wage reported" (2000:18). 
Dias has offered positive suggestions, although when specifying "full-time" in the question 
this should be backed ur with a precise definition of what it means. How many hours and 
how many days per week is one expected to work? Does this include other benefits etc.? By 
specifying that the job is wid1in 5 kilometres of the respondent's residence, this will 
hopefully reduce the problem of rural respondents reporting wages they expect to get in an 











4. Reservation Wages in KMP 
Having rcyiewcd particular work in South j\frica on measuring reservation wages and being 
aware of the problems encountered and suggested solutions, the discussion will now focus 
on hO\v resen-ation wage s were mcasured in KMP and whethcr a respondent's economic 
bchayiour is consistent 111 light of their rescnration wage. 
4.1 Measurement 
In the I~\IP sunrey, direct information pertaining to a respondent's resenration wage is asked 
in SL" separatc places. Table 2 below lists the associated questions. 




; No. I 
Question 
F24 \\'nat do \ ou think would be a reasonable take-
home monthly wage for you given your desired 
hours of work and your age, education, skills, and 
area of re::idence etc. I 
Obs 
1100 
F2S \Vhat is tbe absolute minimum t~ke-home month~099 







I work in any job (taking into account your desired I 
~.. I hours of w"Ork~')_? _______ ' _________ i---____ -+_' ___ 'I' 
G29 i V(11at is the absolute lowest weekly take-home 208 2656 
I I
' wage vou would accept if offered; job? i 
I----I-S----l-\\'hat 1S the lowest daIly take.-b-c-)m-e'-,-va-g-e-yo-u-\\-'(-m-l-d-'-, -·-1-2-4-1--'----2-3-1-9---11 
~-------l:-b-e-'--preparcd to accept for a casual job? I 118 i \\lhat is the lowest daily take-home wage you would i 353 
be ne arcd to accept for a casual job? ! 
r------~-~-L~ 
K5 \\'hat is the absolute lowest monthly take home 2267 





1 The calculated mean mOD' hly reservation wage has nor been adjusted in a11\' way for outlier" which may have resulted 
from recording or other C-Tors, 
".;umbers in brackers arc tnc median response to the assocIated ClllCStiol1. 
Before analysing the questions individually, it is important to note that they all specify a 
"take-home" wage or, in other \vords, the wage once any deductions have been made (e.g. 











com'ert all previous wage s, refused wages and hypothetical wages to take-home wages 
making the necessary tax adjustments. 
Respondents who stated that they are not currently wage or self-employed, and who want a 
job, would have answered questions F24 and F25. The phrasing of questions F24 and F25 
are quite different which will help explain the associated clifference in their means with 
question F24 ha\-ing a mean response of over R1500 and question F25 a mean response of 
about R950 - a difference of more than R550. Question F24 seems more likely to be 
probing what an indi\'idual thinks a fair wage would be and not the minimum he/she would 
be prepared to work for. Question F25 on the other hand seeks to uncover a person's 
absolute reservation wage - asking the wage below \vruch a person "would not be prepared 
to work." \,(!ithout further information, one may conclude that an 111di,-idual's reservation 
wage is approximately two-thirds of what he/ she would report as a fair wage. 
Respondents who have engaged in non-wage income-earning acti"ities (self-employment) in 
the last SL,,{ months would have answered question G29. Question G29 is trying to probe the 
minimum wage that an J11dividual would need to be paid to mm-e from self-employment Into 
more formal wage-employment. The mean wage of over R2600 has been calculated by 
com-erting the reported mean weekly take-home wage to a monthly take-home wageY• This 
mean is far higher than that from questions F24 or F25, indicating that the unemployed are 
more desperate for work, possibly as they are less employable and have lower property 
income on which to depend. To try and understand why the G29 mean is so much higher, 
the means of self-employed gross income, money left for salaries and take-home profit were 
calculated as shown in table 3. 
TABLE 3: l\feans of selected Self-Employment Income 
9 From a discussion with Dudley Horner (Deputy Director SALDRC) on the 16 May 2003, it was agreed that for the 
purposes of this paper: all daily wages would be multiplied by 21.75, all weekly wages would be multiplied by 4.33 
and all fortnightly wages would be multiplied by 2. 17 to estimate a monthly wage respeetively. To derive 21.75: 104 
(number of weekend days in year) is subtracted from 365 (number of days in a year). This result, 261, is then divided 
by 12, giving 21.75 working days in a month. In similar fashion there are 4.33 weeks in a month (52/12) and 2.17 











Initially it was hypothesised that a self-employed person's reserYation wage, to be drawn 
from self-employment into formal wage-employment, would be related to what he/she earns 
in self-employment. The idea being that the formal wage compensates at least for what is 
earned in self-employment. Table 3 shows that this is the case but much more than 
expected. The mean reservation wage of over R2600 is far higher than e'"en the mean gross 
income earned in a month. Perhaps, just compensating a self-employed individual for the 
loss of income is not enough, and that the loss of freedom to control one's own 
business/ time plus the k,ss of enjoyment and satisfaction from running a business etc. has to 
be included in the compensation. 
Question IS would have been answered by people who have not done casual work in the six 
months prior to the survey and who would like to do casual ,vork. Most of these 
respondents (68%) are classified as broadly or marginally unemployed, with the difference 
being made up by those respondents in wage-employment or self-employment who would 
like a few days of casual work. The mean reservation wage (adjusted to a monthly wage) for 
casual work in this instance is about R2319. Comparing this to the mean from question F25 
(R958) shows the extent to which job security, offered by a permanent monthly job, is 
,"alued. Respondents haye to be paid a lot more to do casual work in order to compensate 
for the lack of job secunty offered by a casual job and the days waiting to find the job. 
Question 118 is the same as IS except that only those people who ha,"e done casual work in 
the s1.,{ months prior to the survey answered it. Of this group, fewer respondents (53%) are 
classified as broadly or marginally unemployed compared to those who answered IS, which 
explains the higher mean reservation wage of over R2900 (adjusted to a monthly wage). 
Once again this indicates the greater desperation amongst the unemployed to find work, 
gi,oen the lower mean reservation wage in IS. 
The final question that seeks to probe a person's resen"ation wage is K5, which is a question 
within the resen"ation wage section of the survey. As can be seen by the number of 
observations, almost the entire sample answered this question, including those in wage-
employment '\iho were told to assume they were unemployed at the time. Once again it asks 
for the "absolute lowest monthly take home wage" but is different from F25 in that it asks 
the minimum a person would "accept", as opposed to the minimum "below" which he/she 
would not be prepared to work. This subtle difference in the question is important, as 











ga\'e a different reservation wage. Either the different phrasing of the questions causes the 
difference in reserYation wage, or people do not have a specific reserYation wage, or are 
rather \'ague about the concept. 
:rABJ ~E 4: Comparisons gf the difference between responses to question K5 & F25 
Of the respondents who answered both questions K5 and F25, table 4 shows the percentage 
who reported the same reservation wage for both questions, a higher reservation wage in K5 
than F25 and a lower re:-;ervation wage in K5 than F25. It is interesting that 42% of the 
respondents reported a higher reservation wage in K5 than F25. One could argue that the 
difference in wording between the questions is important in explaining this result. The fact 
that F25 asks the minimum below which people would not be prepared to work as opposed 
to K5 asking the minimum people would accept, seems to encourage a lower positive 
response. Note should be made of this for phrasing of reserYation wage questions in future 
sun'eys. 
Taking the entire sample of respondents who answered K5, one can see that the mean 
resen'ation wage is R1159 and the median R1000. This is higher than the mean (R958) and 
median (R800) for question F25, as question K5 includes respondents who are unemployed 
as well as respondents who are in some form of employment. The mean forKS is lower 
than the mean for F24, reinforcing the idea that question F24 is measuring the respondent's 
notion of a "fair wage" as opposed to a reservation wage. Taking only those respondents 
who are currently in wage-employment increases the mean of K5 to R1374, reinforcing the 
notion that the employ.:d report a higher reservation wage than the unemployed. 
The simple analysis in this section shows that people in different labour market states report 
different resen'ation wages. Furthermore indidduals want increased compensation for casual 
\vork where there is a hek of job security. As this paper seeks to understand what determines 
reservation wages of those entering wage employment and giyen the above analysis, F25 and 
K5 are the likely measures that could be considered as the dependant variable in the 











used as the reservation \vage measure. Different dummy variables will be inserted for the 
different labour market states that individuals may be in and to test how these states impact 
on their reservation wagt. Using work done by Nattrass (2002), individuals will be classified 
according to one of the following states ill : Wage-employed, Self-employed, Casual-employed, 
l\ctive-searching Unemployed, Exclusively 0Jetwork-searching Unemployed, l\Iarginalised 
Unemployed or Non-labour Force Participants. 
4.2 A Closer Evaluation of the Reservation Wage Measure 
Having decided to use K5 as the reservation wage measure, a brief assessment of the 
question is in order, to see how it fares in light of the discussion in section 3. Does it 
overcome the problems suggested by Kingdon and Knight (2001) and does it include some 
of the suggestions offen:d by Dias (2000)? 
The fust glaring problem with K5 is that it does not specify the hours that a person would 
be expected to work in order to earn the "IO\vest monthly take-home wage." It docs not 
specify the distance to \\ ork, but as the survey is in the Cape Town metropolitan area with 
good transportation links this may not be as big a problem as suggested by Kingdon and 
Knight (2001). The problem with not specifying distance to work is when rural respondents 
report a wage they expect to earn in an urban area. A further problem with K5 is that it does 
not specify benefits assoClated with the job in question. For example, it is important to 
instruct the respondent~ that the job has no related benefits and in so doing help standardise 
their responses. This will be especially in1portant when asking employed people their 
reservation wage if unemployed, as they may be in jobs with benefits and take these sinUlar 
benefits into account when reporting their reservation wage. Removing the possibility of 
benefits may cause the employed to ha\re a higher reservation wage. Further qualitative 
research is necessary to uncover how benefits affect one's reservation wage. 
Dias (2000) suggests that income categories be read to respondents when asking them the 
lowest wage they would be prepared to accept. This suggestion would be beneficial when a 
question on reservation wages is asked in a completely random place in a survey. Here 
though, K5 is asked at the end of a section where hypothetical Jobs, offering wages realistic 
iO If people did more than one of the mentioned jobs then they were classified according to the job, which absorbed the 
greatest amount of their time or provided the greatest income. The narrow definition of unemployment would normally 











to the KMP area at the time of the survey, have been discussed. As a result the respondents' 
minds will already be accustomed to thinking about jobs at different wages and will find it 
easier to answer question K5. They will be unlikely to adopt a bargaining stance or report a 
fair wage in answering K5, given that question K5 comes after a number of hypothetical job 
offers where the response is simply yes or no. In addition, they will not feel pressure 
suddenly to think about rheir reservation wage or to feel that they are being asked this 
question \vith no underslanding of where the response is leading. 
A major criticism thus far has been the lack of panel data to support studies on reservation 
wages in South Africa - as no assessment can be made of pre or post survey wage offers 
refused or accepted. Th( KMP survey goes a long way towards alle,·iating the limitation 
engendered by the fact that it is a once off study, by gathering information on wage histories, 
wage offers rejected and the inclusion of hypothetical job offers. In section 4.3 the paper 
probes how well or com.istently a respondent's economic behaviour is following his/her 
reported reservation wage. Is K5 really measuring a person's reservation wage in Kl'vIP? 
4.3 Does Economic Behaviour Support the Reported Reservation Wage? 
If the respondent's reservation wage is their actual reservation wage, this will be termed a 
'consistent resen'ation ,vage'. \X1hen looking at the consistency of the resen-ation wage, a 
person's economic behaviour in relation to the resen'ation wage needs to be analysed. If 
people accept jobs abme their resen1ation wage and refuse jobs below their reservation wage 
then they are showing consistent behaviour. Showing consistent behaviour is a sign that the 
reported resen"ation wage may well be the respondent's actual resen'ation wage. 
From the Kt\IP survey there are three ways to assess ,vhether the reported reservation wage 
is in fact the person's actual reservation wage. The first option is to look at those 
respondents who are presently working, and to compare their current wage with their 
resen'ation wage if the,' were hypothetically unemployed. The second option is to look at 
those who are unemployed and who have refused jobs, comparing the wage offer refused to 
their resen'ation wage. This analysis is limited in that only 39 respondents refused jobs, of 
whom, only 27 gave useable information on the wage offer refused. The final option is to 
use the information ftc>m section K of the questionnaire where respondents were asked to 
include those who are active,earching, exclusively network-searching and the marginalised unemployed. For a more 











consider whether they would accept certain jobs at a stated \vage if they were unemployed at 
the time. These jobs and the wages on offer were realistic to I~\IP at the dme of the survey. 
4.3.1 Current Wage (Wage-employed) vs. Reservation Wage (W'age- employed) 
For those classified as bcing in wage-employment, it was possible to construct a monthly 
after tax wage for 753 re'pondents ll • Of these 753 respondents, 647 answered question K5 
and reported their resenadon wage if unemployed at the time. Table 5 below shows the 
mean monthly wage and resenradon wage for this group. 
TABLE 5: i\[eans of Curr~nt Wage and Reported Resen'ation Wage for Wage Earners 
I .. 
I After Tax Monthly Wage .----f--. 
I Reported Reservati0l!.~age .. .L-. 







From table 5 it can be seen that the mean resenration wage is below the mean after tax 
monthly wage. Thus in general, working people are reporting resen'ation wages below their 
current wage, which is a sign that the economic behaviour of those who arc employed is 
consistent with their rescnration wage (i.e. they have accepted jobs where the wage offered is 
higher than their resenration wage). To test this consistency further, the mean of the 
difference between the clfter tax monthly wage and reported resen'ation wage was calculated. 
The result of R389 further indicates that in general people are reporting reservadon wages 
below that of their current wage. This simple analysis suggests that in general respondents 
are reporting their reservation wage and acting accordingly in their economic behaviour. 
4.3.2 Wage Offers Refused vs. Reservation Wage12 of the Unemployed 
Question Fll13 asks re::opondents if they have turned dO\vn job offers, during the time they 
have wanted work (as probed in question FlO). 39 respondents refused jobs but of these 
only 27 reported useable information on the wage offer refused. Information for these 27 is 
II A large proportion of the 753 reported a monthly after-tax wage. The rest reponed a daily, weekly or fortnightly 
after-tax wage the necessary adjustments were made to convert these to monthly wages. This monthly wage measure 
is used in section 6 when trying to estimate a predicted wage. 
I:: The analysis in this section follows work done by Nattrass (2002). The difference is that all respondents who 
reported they had refused work during the time period they had wanted work are included. Nattrass only selects those 
who are defined as broadly unemployed. 











displayed in table 6. Befe·re proceeding with any analysis it is noted that 27 is a very small 
sample from which to make any significant conclusions. Howeyer, for lack of other 
information, it is still useful to look at the job offers refused in light of the respondents' 
reSelTatlOn wages. 
TABLE 6: Selected information on those who ha\'e refused jobs 
Notes 
1. In line with ]\.;attrass (200.2), real monthly wage offers refused were calculated on the assumption of 1 0% inflation per 
annum. 
2. Only two of the above rc,pondcnts reported a wage offer before-tax. One was R3500 a month before-tax and the 
other R900 a month before-tax. According to the Budget Review 2000 (Department of hnancc, 2000:81) the offer of 
H.900 a month would not be taxed whereas the R3500 would fall into the 35001-45000 per annum tax-bracket. The 
necessary adjustment has been made. 
3. Daily wages, weekly wage; and fortnightly wages were converted to monthly wages using the formula discllssed in 
section 4.1. 
In table 6, the final column headed 'Diff', is the calculated difference be1\veen the 
respondent's reservatie,n wage and his or her real after-tax monthly wage refused. A 











beha,'iour on the part of the respondent, as he/she has refused a job offer with a wage 
higher than their reservanon wage. 
Of the 27 respondents listed, 10 (37%) show inconsistent behaviour. Three of these 10 
respondents (numbers 8, 14 and 26) gave the reason for not accepting the job as "quarrelled 
with management", "family duties" and "job too far away" respectively. For these 3 
respondents, even though their reservation wage is below the wage offered, their reasons for 
not accepting the jobs suggests they were prevented from taking the job even if they would 
ha,'e liked to work. Thm their behaviour cannot be termed inconsistent. 
The reasons gin~n by the other 7 do not preclude them from displaying inconsistent 
behaviour. If their reponed reservation wage was their actual reselTation wage they would 
not give the following reasons for refusing the jobs - "did not like job", "wage too low" and 
"below skill level." These reasons indicate that they actively took the decision to refuse the 
job and were not prevented from taking it. Thus, their reported reservation wage is not the 
lowest wage they would accept for any job, gi,'en they are unemployed at the time. 
Taking the abm'e discussion into account, only 26% (7 of 27) show inconsistent behaviour. 
Once again this indicate.., that the majority of respondents are refusing jobs consistent with 
their stated reservation wage. 
4.3.3 Comparing hypothetical jobs with the Reservation Wage 
Section K of the questionnaire deals specifically with resenTation wages. In this section 
respondents are given the option of four hypothetical jobs that were realistic to areas 
adjacent to I~\IP at the time of the survey. The respondents were asked to respond either 
"yes" or "no" as to whether they would accept the jobs, at the specified wage rate, if they 











TABLE 7: Hypothetical)ob Offers 
1\01c, 
1. Que,;tiot1 K-l ["fer, to pre-tax rates of pay. No tax adjustment needs to be made for anI' of the job,;, as the wage,; earned 
arc too low to be included in any of the taxable brackets. The tax threshold being R21 111 per veal', according to the Budget 
Rc\·icw of 2000 (Department of I<'inanCl:, llowey-cr, for future ,;urvcys, It would be worthwhile to inform 
rcspomknt,; of the tax threshold. so that the true t:lkc·homc value of the lob can be 
Once again, the consistency of the respondents' reserYation wages arc to be analysed by 
assessing the responses to the questions in table 7. No comparison will be made between the 
results from question IC~ and the reserration wage because K2 offers a casual job, whereas 
the reserntion wage is for a permanent monthly job. Not understanding exactly how job 
security is traded for income will make this comparison difficult. 
Three new variables were generated that equalled the monthly take-home wage offered in 
questions K4.1 to K4.3. For each respondent, the difference between their reported 
resen'ation wage and tht:se yariables was calculated14• The analysis in this section calculates 
the percentage of respondents whose responses were consistent and probes inconsistencies. 
The decision rule, in analysing the consistency of the reserYation wage, \vas based on four 
simple criteria: 
Firstly, the reservation wage is termed "consistent" if the calculated difference is 
positiye and the respondent refused the associated job or if the calculated difference 
is negati\'e and the respondent accepted the associated job. For example if the 
difference is positive, then the respondent's reservation wage is higher than the 
offered wage. T CJ be consistent the respondent would ha\'e to refuse this job as it 











Secondly, the resetvation wage is termed "inconsistent" if the calculated difference is 
positive and the respondent accepts the associated job or if the calculated difference 
is negative and the respondent refuses the associated job. For example if the 
difference is positive, then the respondent's resetvation wage is higher than the 
offered wage. If this job were accepted then the behaviour is inconsistent as the 
respondent is accepting a job where the offered wage is below his/her resetvation 
wage. 
As shown in table 7: the job offer in K4.1 is a cleaner with a monthly wage of RlGSl, the job 
offer in K4.2 is a general worker with a monthly wage of R1438 and the job offer in K4.3 is 
a machine operator with a monthly wage of R1619 . Table 8 lists the consistency between the 
respondents' reported resetvation wages and their acceptance or refusal of the three jobs. 
TABLE 8: Resetvation Wage and cleaner, general worker and machine operator job offers 
Decision Rule Percentage of Respondents 
Oeaner I General Worker Machine Operator 
Consistent: res >-vvage offer and refusal llH 8% I 7% Consistent: res <wage offer and acceptance 58 66% 62% 
Inconsistent: res >-vvage offer and acceptance 23% 19% 21% 
Inconsistent: res <wage offer and refusal 6% 7% 10% 
The first notable feature of the results is that roughly 70% of the respondents are showing 
consistency between their reservation wage and the acceptance or refusal of the three jobs. 
Secondly, the majority of inconsistency lies with respondents accepting the jobs at wage 
offers below their reservation wage. This may reflect the seriousness of unemployment in 
the area and the desperation to find work, but also that respondents are not taking the high 
levels of unemployment into account when reporting their resetvation wage. Only when 
presented with an offer are we able to gauge a person's true resetvation wage. Thirdly, only a 
very small percentage of the respondents are actually refusing jobs where their resetvation 
wage is below the wage offered. Inconsistency in this respect may reflect a person's taste for 
work or preference for employment given the nature of the job. Further investigation 
showed that about 44% of the respondents who refused the cleaner job where the wage 
offer was above their resetvation wage (inconsistent behaviour) are classified as non-labour 
l4 For example, if the reservation wage were R2000, then the difference (K5 K4.1) between the reservation wage and 











force participants. In this regard it is difficult to term their beha,-iour as being inconsistent. 
In fact by refusing the job they are being consistent with their present labour market 
position where they may for example still be studying or too old to work. 
The question posed at the beginning of this section 4.3, is whether the economic behaviour 
of respondents supported their reported reservation wage. The purpose in trying to answer 
this question is to probe whether respondents are in fact reporting the minimum wage they 
would accept. As has been shown, the mean wage earned by those in wage employment is 
substantially higher than their mean reported reservation wage. For those who have refused 
jobs, the majority (about 74%) have refused job offers where the wage is below their 
resenration wage. Finan;" in analysing the responses to the hypothetical job offers one can 
safely conclude that the majority of respondents (about 70%) are being consistent in 
accepting or refusing jobs with a monthly wage given their resen·ation wage. 
One can conclude from these results, that in general, KS is a good measure of a person's 
resen-ation wage and needs no adjustment for the regression analysis. Section S will probe 











5. Detenninants of Reservation Wages in KMP 
Ordinary Least Square,> (OLS) regression will form the basis of the analysis of what factors 
impact on an individual's reservation wage. The regression equations will take the following 
form: 
The dependant variable will be the log of the individual's reservation wage and the 
explanatory variables (X) will be drawn from a list of variables as discussed in Section 5.1. 
Only those respondents who are between the ages of 18 and 65 are included in the 
regression analysis. Furthermore, of the respondents classified as non-labour force 
participants, all those who mentioned being too old or too sick are not included as they are 
not able to function effectively in employment, even if they wanted to. Non-Iabourforce 
participants who are still within the economically active age and gave reasons such as 'still in 
school', 'rather not work', 'prefer leisure' etc. are still included as they may accept a job if the 
'correct' wage is offered. In terms of racial breakdown only Cbloureds and Africans are 
compared, as there are too few respondents of other races. 
5.1 Discussion of Variables 15 
As shown in AppendLx A, most of the reservation wages are clustered around R1000 per 
month. At the top end, three observations were dropped from the analysis as they were 
considered outliers and may affect the regression results l6• At the bottom end, no outliers 
were considered for investigation as they are all 'Vvithin two standard deviations of the mean. 
The reservation wage and three measures of income (as discussed further on) were adjusted 
by taking the log of these variables. This adjustment is necessary to control for any scale 
effects resulting from the wide variation in these variables compared to other variables, as 
shown in table 9. The standard deviation of the reservation wages is R755, far greater than 
the variation in any of the other continuous explanatory variables. In addition, a number of 
15 Appendix B offers a discussion of explanatory variables that were considered, but not used in this study. They may 
however be applicable in other studies. 











the explanatory variables are categoricaL Using the log of the reserntion wage, as opposed 
to the reported reservation wage will produce better results and estimates of relationships 
that may exist, as the valiation in reservation wage will be reduced and extreme values will 
have less of an impact. 
TABLE 9: Summary Stats of Reservation Wage & Continuous Explanatory Variables '7 
r---. 
I 
Obs I Mean Std. Dev. Min ! Max i 
I Reservation Wage (rands) 2011 1165.8 755.4 . 10 7000 
In (Reservation Wa~ 2011 6.87 0.7 2.3 . 8.9 
Age (years~ 2217 34.1 11.7 18 80 
1 Numplov 2217 0.9 0.8 . 0 2 
. Educati~n I 2182 8.6 . 3.3 0 15 
'------
I Hhold Income (rands) 1884 i 3399.3 4528.9 i 51 60500 .-. .~ 
!In(Hhold Income) 1884 . .,-7_.3:-ri ____ 1_.5-+-___ 1_.6-\-1 ___ ._11.......;1, 
I Net Hhold Income 1857 2063.5 I 3448.5 0 33300 
[In(Net Hho~ncome) -=r----j-... ~-.-1-85-7---l----5-.7--l1--- -3---;--! ---0-+1--1-0-.4-1 
Contr Hhold Income . 1857 1362.9 I 2813.9 i O. 37600 
i In(Contr Hhold Inc) . 1857 3.7 1 3.7 I 01 I 10.5 I 
iDuration of unemp (months)L 1025 .. 43.2 I --::5"-0.-4-t-: ----+. --3"-7-6~' 
--~-~ ~-----~---
In section 2 the importance of non-wage (property) income in affecting a person's 
reSelYation wage was highlighted. The theory is that those people who ha'.'e higher non-wage 
income can afford to sLrvive in unemployment for longer and '.vill therefore have a higher 
reservation wage. This can be tested using data collected by the IZMP sun'ey. The measure 
of household income (hhold income) that is used has been compiled by aggregating the 
indh'idual incomes for each household (wage, self, casual, grant, remittance income etc. see 
Skordis and Welch (20(l2) for a complete discussion'~) instead of using the reported 
household income from the household level questionnaire. The reason for this is twofold: 
Firstly, Skordis and Welch (2002) find that household income estimates tend to be 
higher and have greater variation when formulated by aggregating individual income 
estimates as compared to the household income measure from the household level 
questionnaue. Thus, the household level questionnaire may not be measuring 
household income correctly. 
17 Adjusted sample used in regression analysis. 
18 In compiling the householc income measure, the gross wage earned by each individual was used instead of a net 











Secondly, having an aggregated measure of household income, it will be easy to dis-
aggregate and determine how separate components affect a household member's 
reservation wage. For example, to see whether changes in wage income in the 
household are more significant in explaining changes in the respondent's reservation 
wage than say changes in household income earned via casual work The hypothesis 
being that any changes in wage income would be more serious in terms of future 
income security than changes in casual income. This is similar to work done by 
Klasen and Woolard where they try and assess whether pension and private incomes 
"constitute a direct disincentive to search by raising the reservation wage" (2000:18). 
In their study they find that pension and remittance incomes do not appear to raise 
reservation wages and only self-employment income and private income is associated 
with higher reservation wages. 
In addition, the effect~ of two further measures of household income will be tested in the 
regression analysis when including only those respondents in wage-employment. The first is 
household income minus the contribution of the particular respondent to household income 
(net hhold income) and the second is the contribution of the respondent to household 
income (contr hhold income). As noted earlier, the log of these household income 
measures will be used to control for the wide variation in these variables as shown in table 9. 
As discussed in section 2 a person's reservation wage in KMP will be affected by the benefits 
of being searching-unemployed (B(s)) and/or the benefits from being out of the labour force 
in state i (B(o,~). B(o,i) will include non-wage (propeJt0 income as discussed but also such 
things as an improved qualification, spending greater time in leisure or with one's children 
etc. This list could be quite extensive with many factors that are not easily measurable (i.e. 
the value of leisure time for each respondent). For the purpose at hand, education and 
number of children have been identified as important explanatory variables. A variable was 
created that measured the number of children under the age of 16 in the household but as 
discussed in AppendL'I: B was not a significant predictor of the reservation wage. However, 
education is an important explanatory variable and will be discussed further on. 
B(s) is made up of the sum of [(P) (E[Wj]/x] and bsu as discussed in section 2. bsu includes 
the non-wage (property) income that a person can rely on in unemployment. The 
importance of B(s) lies in the impact of the expected value and probability of getting a job 











characteristics. In terms of value functions, certain x characteristics will improve a person's 
chance of getting a job or raise their expected wage. As a result, the \'alue for them of 
searching will be higher Hnd they will have a higher resel'Yation wage than someone who 
does not share these favourable characteristics. The purpose of the regression analysis is to 
break these two steps into one and instead of looking at how PI and E[wJ affect the 
reservation \"age, rather how certain characteristics directly impact on a person's reservation 
wage. 
IZlasen and Woolard (2000) find that age, gender, race and education have a large and 
significant impact on reservation wages. Table 10 shows the mean resen'ation wage for 
different age categories in I(1vfP increasing as one moves from the 18-22 category up to the 
40-49 category. After tht: 40-49 category the mean declines slightly, indicating a peak in a 
person's resen'ation wage somewhere in mid-career (40-49). This peak will be tested in the 
regression analysis by the use of an age-squared variable. The mean reservation wage of 
males (R1301) is higher than that offemales (R1072). The mean resen'ation wage of 











TABLE 10: r..Iean Resel':ation Wage ~cross different Variables (in randsy9 
----.------
Labour Market Status 
No. of other wage-employed in hhold 
a job 











In coding the education variable, a year of education was assi!:,Tlled for each year of school 
completed. If a person finished matric they were assigned 12, for 12 years of education 
completed. Years of post-school education completed were added in addition to schooling. 
Of the respondents, 601 indicated that they had done some form of post-school education, 
of which 410 had completed their studies. The respondents who had not completed their 
post-school studies recelved no extra years of education. 
The K\IP questionnaire offers numerous post-school study options, ranging from training 
courses for the unemplc,yed to a university qualification. In order to add extra years for post-
schooling, an assessment was made of the mean time it took the group of people who had 
completed a certain course or diploma to finish. This was possible as the questionnaire asked 
each respondent if they had completed their studies, the age they began, and the age they 
finished. Table 11 shows the mean time in years that it took for people to complete their 
respectiye courses, diplomas or degrees. 
TABLE 11: l\lean time in years to complete courses, diplomas or degrees 
Obs Mean time to 
complete (yrs) 
course for unemployed 0.96 
i Training course at work 1.49 
Years assigned~ 
post-school educ I 
~~~.~~~--~~--~--------------r--~--,-----~------r--.----~---. 
certificates 0.91 1 
2.03 2 
3.47 3 
According to the means in table 11, years of post-school education completed were assigned, 
as per column 3. Table 10 shows how the mean reselTation wage increases substantially as 
years of education completed rises. For those who are in the category of having completed 
zero years of education to standard 5, the mean reservation wage is RI040. For those who 
have completed univer,ity the mean resen'ation wage is R1877. 
Prasad (2000:46) finds that those who are married tend to have a lower reservation wage 
and that the status of household head "exerts a positi\Te effect on the resen'ation wage." 











are married (RI297) is higher than the mean reservation wage of those who are unmarried 
(Rl 068). This difference may be better explained by the impact of age. More than 80% of 
those who are married are between 30 and 64 years of age (when reported reservation wages 
are highest), as opposed to 60% of those who are unmarried being below the age of 30. 
Controlling for age the regression analysis will be able to test this. The mean reservation 
wage of household heads (R1265) is higher than the mean reservation wage of other 
household members (RIll 1), supporting Prasad's findings20. 
Prasad's (2000) regression results show that the number of other employed persons in the 
household is a significant detenninant of the reservation wage. Table 10 supports this 
finding in showing that the mean reservation wage of those households with two or more 
employed persons (R1328) is the highest compared to the mean reservation wage of 
households with 1 or zero other employed persons. Number of other employed people can 
be a further measure of financial security (linking to the discussion of property income) 
andl or affect the probability of a respondent getting a job, thereby influencing a person's 
reservatlon wage. 
Jones (1988) found that people with higher reservation wages have longer periods of 
unemployment duration as they can afford to stay unemployed longer until a better job 
offer is received. In this case a person can control the decision to accept a job via evaluating 
different job opportunities. In KMP the causality we are trying to measure is the opposite. 
The lack of jobs means that unemployed people do not have control over their employment 
prospects and need to wait until they are 'lucky' enough to find employment. The hypothesis 
being that the longer a person remains unemployed, the lower his/her reservation wage falls 
as a result of human capital loss and an increased desperation to find work. Prasad points 
out that "one would expect the reservation wage to decline over time on account of wealth 
effects and human capital depreciation" (2000:45). Standing mentions sociological research 
that has shown how "prolonged unemployment reduces a worker's employability, morale, 
and capacity for work" (1978:233). In Holzer's (1985) study on reservation wages and their 
effect on the labour market outcomes of black and white youth he notes that, particularly for 
black youth, as their unemployment duration lengthens so too do their reservation wages 
decline. The mean duration of unemployment in KMP is about 43 months (see table 9). 
20 Regardless of the model specification, the regression results (not shown) do not find any significant difference 
between household heads and other household members in explaining variation in reservation wages. Often the signs 











Table 10 shows a decline in the mean reservation wage, as duration of unemployment 
increases, from R 1158 f()r those who have been unemployed for less than 6 months to R922 
for those who ha,\re been unemployed between 48 and 96 months. 
Standing claims that migrants "are likely to have less knO\vledge of prevailing urban wage 
rates and, possibly with fewer income-sharing contacts on whom to rely, a greater need for 
an income from work, however small" (1978:233). In terms of the specitled value functions, 
a person from a rural arca may have a lower probability of securing employment Oack of 
contacts, urban labour market experience etc.) and as a result a lower reservation wage. With 
this in mind, a person's background may provide strong explanatory power in describing 
variation in the reservatlOn wage. Place of birth is chosen to proxy for a respondents 
background. Table 10 shows that those born in an urban area have a higher mean 
reservation wage (R129S) than those born in a rural area (RI028). This supports the idea that 
people from a rural area may have migrated to KivfP in search of work, are more desperate 
to secure cmploymcnt and will thus participate at a lowcr wage. 
A factor that may significantly affect the probability and expccted value of someone getting a 
job in IZl\IP, and thus tllCir reservation wage, is their b.re! of work experience. Potential 
cxpericnce is usually proxied by the formula: Age - Years of Education 6. With the 
disjomted employment historics in KMP and the high levels of uncmployment this docs not 
scem a viable way to m,;asure work experiencc. Keswell and Poswell (2002:12) use 'age' 
instead of 'potential experience' in their paper on returns to education, as "grade repetition, 
low educational attainment, and job insecurity (problems which typify South Africa) will 
likely produce oYerestimates of the effect of potential experience." The effect of age is 
already included but to measure work experience more directly a dummy variable (work) was 
created to distinguish between those who have worked before from those who have never 
had a job. One would expect there to be a difference (amongst the unemployed) between the 
resen'ation wage of th(lse who've worked before and those who haven't. Those who have 
worked may have a better idea of their labour market value and report a reservation wage in 
line with this. On one hand those who have never \vorked may have unrealistic wage 
expectations and report higher reservation wages, as e\'idenced by I<ingdon and Knight 
(2001). Alternatively, those who have never worked may acknowledge they have less 
experience and expect to earn a lower wage than those who ha\re worked and thus have a 











reselTation wage of the group who have worked before (R 1060 & R 1000) is higher than the 
mean and median reserntion wage of the group who have ne\Ter worked (R936 & R800). 
The discussion in section 4 highlighted the Importance of labour market status in affecting 
a person's resenration wage. As discussed, using the classifications de\reloped by Nattrass 
(2002) for I~\[P, dumm \' variables will be inserted into the regression analysis to test 
whether there is significmt difference between the reservation wages of people with 
different labour market classifications. Table 10 shows e\'idence that there is a difference 
with those in wage-employment having the highest mean reselTation wage (R1355). It is 
interesting to note that for the unemployed categories, the highest mean reservation wage is 
for those who are searching unemployed (R1066), declines for those who are network 
searching unemployed (R957) and is lowest for those who are ~[arginalised (R944). Thus, on 
average those \vho are actively looking for work ha,'e a higher reservation wage than those 
who are marginalised and not even trying to fmd a job. Finally, non-labour force participants 
ha\'e a higher than average mean reservation wage of R1272 indicating a stronger desire to 
remain out of wage employment. 
Finally, the I~\IP sun'e',' tried to collect information on a person's expectation towards 
getting a job. This is likely to be affected by labour market status, as those who are 
marginally unemployed are likely to be more discouraged than those who are searching 
unemployed. The I~\[P survey asks those who are unemployed". , . how long you think it 
will be before you get a job." From this question21 each respondent was classified as being 
either very positive, positive, neither positive nor disheartened, disheartened or very 
disheartened about their prospects for getting a job. Table 10 shows no clear pattern in the 
mean reservation wage for each category from very positive to very disheartened, however 
the medians seem to decline as the attitude to\vards getting a job becomes less positive. 
5.2 Results 
Table 12 displays the regression results. 
21 Question FI7 was used in order to test how expectation towards getting a job affected a respondent's reservation 
wage. The question read, "We now want to ask you how long you think it will be before you get ajob." If the 
respondent felt that they had a realistic possibility of getting a job within the next month they were classified as "very 
positive." If the respondent fe It that they had a realistic possibility of getting a job within the next three months they 
were c1assl1'icd as "positive." If the respondent felt that they had a realistic possibility of getting ajob within the next 
six months they were classified as "neither positive nor disheartened." If the respondent felt that they had a realistic 
possibility of getting ajob within the next year they were classified as "disheartened," lfthe respondent felt that they 











TABLE 12: Regression Results 
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Regression 1, listed in table 12, includes respondents from all labour force classifications. 
The explanatory variables are age, numploy (number of other wage-employed persons in 
the household), educ (highest education level completed), gen (gender), race and married 
and are all significant at the 1% level. The regression however has an R-squared value of 
0.1463, thus only 14.63% of variation in the reservation wage is being explained by the 
included explanatory variables. As a result much of the variation in the reservation wage is 
still unexplained. This is a weakness of all the regressions in table 12 and especially those 
regressions where only the unemployed are included. In these regressions the R-squared is 
around 0.09 - only 9% of the variation is explained! An obvious reason for the low R-
squared is that other significant determinants of reservation wages have not been captured. 
However, the low R-squared is not necessarily a cause for concern given that R-squared's are 
typically low in cross sectional analysis. It would be highly unrealistic to expect a high 
proportion of the variation in the reservation wage to be explained with our limited 
understanding, at this stage, of what impacts on reservation wages. The interest in using 
regression analysis is to see how the listed explanatory variables (from discussion in section 
5.1) impact on a person's reservation wage controlling for other effects - rather than trying 
to specify a model with the greatest explanatory power (but with less analytical rigour). As 
research on reservation wages is deepened, more of this variation in the reservation wage will 
hopefully be explained as further determinants are discovered and introduced. Already it is 
interesting to note that when only a regression is specified for those classified as 
'marginalised unemployed' and the variable 'work' is included, the explained variation in the 
reservation wage doubles. Elsewhere 'work' had little explanatory power but suddenly 
becomes significant as an explanatory variable. What does this mean? This will be discussed 
further on. 
Returning to the regression 1, a brief discussion of the coefficients is in order: 
• The coefficient on 'age' is positive and sho\VS that as people grow one year older, 
their reservation wage on average increases by about 0.7%, controlling for other 
factors. This supports earlier evidence from table 10 where the mean reservation 
wage increased up until the 40 to 49 age category and declined slightly thereafter. An 











age and reservation wage. The age-squared variable turned out insignificant and 
showed no evidence that reservation wages seem to peak in middle age. 
• The coefficient on 'numploy' is positive and indicates that for each additional 
employed person in the household a person's reservation wage increases by about 
5.5%. There are two possible explanations for this. Firstly, household income is 
directly related to the number of employed people in the household. Extra employed 
people mean greater household income. As a result, households with extra employed 
people have more income to support those who are unemployed and offer greater 
income security to those in unemployment, thus allowing unemployed individuals to 
have a higher reservation wage. Secondly, higher numbers of employed people in the 
household may indicate that the prospects of an unemployed person finding a job 
are increased. 'This idea links in with evidence presented by Kingdon and Knight 
from a 1995 survey of employers that showed how" 41 % of firms relied on friends 
and relatives of existing workers for their recruitment" (2000:8). The greater the 
number of employed people within a household, the better the network for the 
unemployed person to find a job. With better networks comes a higher reservation 
wage, as the unemployed expect to get a better job more quickly. 
However 'numploy' becomes insignificant in regression 4 where labour market status 
is included, regression 5 where only wage-employed people are included and 
regression 8 where only the unemployed are included. 'Numploy' is not significant in 
regression 4 as there is evidence that 'manploy' is correlated with labour market 
status. Labour market status is a significant predictor of the number of wage-
employed people in a household. The insignificance of 'numploy' in regression 5 is 
not surprising, especially given regression 6 showing how a wage-employed person 
only takes their contribution into account when reporting their reservation wage (as 
will be discussed further). 
However for regression 8 where only the unemployed are included, it is surprising 
that 'numploy' is insignificant especially when regression 9 shows the significance of 
household income in influencing a person's reservation wage. For the unemployed 
one would expect the number of employed members in the household to be a 











and the possibility of finding a job. Looking at the data it is clear that there is not 
equal variability in the 'numpIoy' variable for the unemployed group, with more than 
half of the unemployed people coming from households with no other person in 
wage-employment. This lack of variability may be a reason for the insignificance of 
'numpIoy' in regression 8. However, one must not discotmt the possibility that other 
household members in wage-employment do not signify any form of job security. 
With such variable employment histories in KMP, one can safely assume that 
employment duration is probably highly variable. With this in mind, people may put 
little faith in an employed person being able to support them. Perhaps the 
significance of household income in explaining reservation wage variation in 
regression 9 is due to grant and other income and not to wage income from 
employed people in the household. Further analysis (i.e. dis aggregating the 
household income measure) is inconclusive but on average the contribution of wage 
income is about 75% of household income. As a result one can assume that wage 
income is a major contributor to the significance of household income. 
• The coefficient on 'educ' is positive as expected and indicates that for each year of 
education completed a person's reservation wage rises by 3.8%. 
• The coefficient on 'gen' is positive and indicates that on average males have 
reservation wages about 23% higher than females. This differential stays relatively 
constant through all the regressions, dropping slightly when the regressions are 
restricted to unemployed people. An explanation for this drop is that controlling for 
household income and duration of unemployment reduces the effect of gender on a 
person's reservation wage. The important question to ask though, is why are males' 
reservation wages higher than those of females? One argument is that culture and 
society impact on the earning role that males are supposed to fill. The expectation to 
be the breadv-inner causes males to have higher reservation wages on average than 
females. Alternatively, 52% of males and 34% of females are in wage-employment, 
whereas 38% of males and 53% of females are classified as broadly unemployed. 
Thus part of the gender reservation wage differential may be explained by the 
dominance of males in wage-employment and the dominance of females in 
unemployment. Regression 4 controls for labour market status and the gender 











• The coefficient on 'race' is also relatively constant through different model 
specifications, with Coloureds having a reported reservation wage on average 32% 
higher than Africans. This racial differential of the reservation wage may be a further 
legacy of Apartheid where Africans were paid the least for comparable jobs and as a 
result are still prepared to work for less. 
• Finally, the coefficient on 'married' shows that on average a married person has a 
reservation wage of 8% higher than a non-married person, supporting the evidence 
from table 10. One may have expected the coefficient to be negative (as found by 
Prasad (2000)), in that married people have more than themselves to look after and 
desperately need a job, thus being prepared to work for less. However, a positive 
coefficient suggests the opposite - that having more people to support, a married 
person is expected to earn more and thus has a higher reservation wage. 
In regression 2 the education variable is dropped and replaced by dummy variables 
indicating different education categories. The positive relationship between education and 
reservation wage is once again apparent, however, looking at categories one is able to 
explore how the magmtude of reservation wages change as people complete different phases 
of education. One noticeable feature is that having any form of post-school education (even 
a training course for the unemployed) causes a person's reservation wage to increase quite 
considerably. Those who have zero schooling to standard 5, but have some form of post-
school education, have a 19% higher reservation wage on average than the base; whereas 
those who have completed standard 6 to 9 have a 12% higher reservation wage on average22 
than the base. Thus although the first group has not reached high school, but has done some 
form of post-school training, they have a higher reservation wage than the group which has 
completed a portion of high school. Looking at the matric variables this is also true. A 
person who has completed matric and has done further education has a reservation wage of 
42% higher on average than the base, compared to 30% higher on average for those with 
matric and no further qualifications. Completion of university increases a person's 
reservation wage by about 69% on average above the base. 
22 It is noted that the coefficient for the 0-5+ variable is only significant at the 10% level whereas the coefficient for the 











The interesting question to ask is why people's reservation wages increase substantially when 
they have even a little bit of post-school education23? There arc two possible answers. Fitstly, 
Kes\vell and Po swell (2002) show that the returns to education in South Africa are convex in 
nature. People may be aware of the better reward for someone with training beyond school 
and expect to be paid more than a person with comparable schooling but no extra training. 
Secondly, people may have expended income in gaining the extra training and in turn expect 
to be rewarded for making this outlay. As a result they haye higher reservation wages than 
those with only schooling. 
Regression 3.1 and 3.2 introduces a person's background into the model through 'urban' - a 
variable that measures a person's place of bitth. As race and background are well correlated, 
with 96% of coloureds coming from an urban area and 70% of Africans from a rural area, 
race is dropped in order to see the effect of background on a persons reSelYation wage. 
Regression 3.2 supports the findings from table 10, with the coefficient on the urban 
variable showing that a person born in an urban area has a 1 higher reservation wage on 
average than someone born in a rural area. However this conclusion must be cautioned, as 
background is insignificant when controlling for race in regression 3.1. 
Regression 4 introducef. labour market status into the analysis. The first notable finding is 
that there are not statistically significant differences between the reSelYation wages of those 
who are self-employed, casual-employed and non-labour force participants and those in 
wage-employment. In analysing the self-employed group more closely24, there is evidence 
that half of the group i::c what one could term survivalists and the other half entrepreneurs. 
Survivalists are those people who have turned to self-employment, not because they have a 
good idea or like running theit own business, but because of the lack of formal sector jobs 
and the desperation to ~urvive. On the other hand entrepreneurs arc those who prefer 
running theit own business to working in formal wage-employment. The mean reservation 
wage for the survj\'alist group is R965, whereas the mean reservation wage for the 
entrepreneurial group is R1368. Using a dummy \'ariable that broke the self-employed group 
into survi\'alists and entrepreneurs showed no significant difference in the reservation wage 
of the survivalists from the entrepreneurs under any model specification. 
c3 Post-school edueation could be a proxy for work experience. However, this finding still holds when controlling for 
work experience (not shown In table 12) through the use of the dummy variable 'work.' 
:;4 Question G28 in the KMP survey asks those who have indicated that they are in self-employment, "If you were 
offered a job with the same wage as your present profit, would you take the job? (Assume that you would work the 
same number of hours for the wage as you do now for profit)." lfpeople answered yes to this question they could be 











In regression 4 the difference in reservation wage between labour market states starts 
becoming significant whcn looking at those \vho are unemployed. If we assume that as you 
mm'e from searching unemployed to network-searching unemployed to marginalised 
unemployed, people are becoming more discouraged2S about thcir prospects of finding a job, 
then there is a good relaTionship between expectations of finding a job and the reservation 
wage. As people become more discouraged their reselTation wage declines from being 8.6% 
less for the searching uncmployed2(' to 17.2% less for the marginalised unemployed. 
As discussed in section .1, Dawes (1993) suggested that in some instances reservation wages 
might be an indication of subsistence requirements rather than self-perceived labour market 
yalue. Eddence of this i5 clear when comparing the wage-employed with the unemployed. 
Including only those in wage-employment in the regression analysis, the coefficient on thc 
education ,~ariable rises to 0.05 as shown in regression 5. Comparing this to regression 8, 
which includes only the unemployed, the education coefficient drops to 0.029. Furthermore, 
when breaking the cduotion yariable into categories and assessing the difference in 
coefficients between regression 7 (wage-employed) and regression 10 (unemployed) there are 
some interesting results. ror all education categories the resen'ation wage of those in wage-
employment is significantly higher than the base compared to the unemployed. For the 
unemployed only those with 6-9+, matric and matric+ show any significance of having a 
resen'ation wage higher than the base27. Thus, the level of education completed is far more 
significant in separating out the difference in rescn·ation wages amongst the wage-employed. 
In addition regression 6 shows that those in wage-employment take far greater cognisance of 
their own contribution to household income (their wage) rather than the leyel of household 
income without their contribution. On average a person who contributes 10(Yo more to 
household income will ha\'e a reservation wage of 0.4% higher, \vhereas the coefficient on 
net household income is highly insignificant2H • This clearly indicates that those in wage-
employment ha\T little concern for possible subsistence requirements but report a 
25 Searching unemployed and network-searching unemployed tend to use networks to find jobs, however the searching 
unemployed are also actively soing out to look for jobs. On these grounds, it is assumed that the searching unemployed 
are more positive about their prospects of finding a job. 
Significant at the 10% level and becomes significant at the 5% level when 'numploy' is dropped from the regression. 
27 The reason why the university coefficient is insignificant is probably as a result of the small sample of only 4 
unemployed people who have a university degree. 











reservation wage that reflects their labour market value. On the other hand household 
income is significant to unemployed people when measuring variation in their reservation 
wages as shown in regression 9 where an increase in household income of 10% leads to a 
rise in an unemployed person's reservation wage of 0.4%. 
In summary, the difference in the co-efficient on the education variable for the wage-
employed and the unemployed indicates the difference in importance attached to education 
as an explanation of variation in the reservation wage of the two groups. The effect of 
education is more pronounced and significant for those in wage-employment. In addition, 
wage-employed individuals place more significance on their own contribution to household 
income (i.e. what they are presently earning) rather than on household income minus their 
contribution. Alternatively, the level of household income has a significant impact on the 
reservation wage of unemployed individuals. This difference between the groups is clear 
evidence that unemployed individuals take greater cognisance of subsistence requirements 
than wage-employed individuals when reporting their reservation wage. Wage-employed 
people are far more concerned with their labour-market value than the unemployed when 
. . 
reportmg reservation wages. 
Looking specifically at all unemployed29 individuals in regression 11, an assessment is made 
of the effect of unemployment duration on a person's reservation wage. As discussed, a 
negative relationship between duration of unemployment and a person's reservation wage is 
expected in KMP. Regression 1130 sho'WS that this is true for unemployment duration of up 
to 2 years - thereafter the results are not as significant. On average, a person who is 
unemployed for 6 months to a year will have a reservation wage of 18% less than a person 
who has been unemployed for less than 6 months. The reservation wage of someone drops 
on average by 19% if they are unemployed for a year to two years as compared to someone 
who has been unemployed for less than 6 months. The results are not significant for those 
who have been unemployed for more than 2 years, possibly because these people have been 
out of the labour market for so long that they have lost touch with what they could 
realistically expect to earn given their characteristics. As a result, the reservation wage they 
are reporting is likely to be random and relatively meaningless. 
29 I tried running separate regressions (not shown) for those defined as narrowly employed but the general results were 
the same as that for the unemployed as a group. The only difference (as discussed) is the significance of the 'work' 
variable for the marginalised unemployed. 
30 Duration of unemployment is in no way linked to labour market status ofthe individual (Le. it was found that a 
consistent amount of searching-unemployed fall into each category of unemployment duration - this holds for the 











Table 10 showed e\"idence that the median reservation wage of those who have worked 
before is higher than the median reservation wage of those who ha\'e never had a job. This 
is not supported in regression 12 where the 'work' coefficient is insignificant. However, in 
regression 14 where anI) the marginally unemployed are included, the coefficient on work is 
significant and shows that those who ha\'e worked report a reservation wage of 19% higher 
than those \vho have ne,'er worked'i. This significance can probably be ascribed to the fact 
that those who are margll1alised unemployed have less contact with the labour market and 
can only truly judge their reservation wage according to what they had received when 
working pre\"iously. Those with previous work experience probably feel they can command a 
higher wage than those who have never worked. 
Finally, expectations on getting a job were introduced to see if they supported the 
evidence found in regre~sion 4 where those who are more discouraged have a lower 
reservation wage. Regression 13 shows that no significant difference in reservation wage is 
explained by the difference between those who are positive and those who are disheartened 
about their job prospects. Even when a dummy variable was used to try and distinguish the 
yery positiye from the very disheartened there was no significant difference in reservation 
wage. 
crsing \Vhite's test, all regression equations were tested to see whether heteroskedasticity 
existed. In addition, those regressions including measures of household income were tested 
for heteroskedasticity by plotting the household income variable against the residuals. No 
sign of heteroskedasticity was found. 
In summary, although the R-squared value of the regressions is low, there are some 
ll1teresting findings worth noting: 
• Firstly, gender and race consistently show significance in explaining \'ariation in 
resenration wages. Males have higher resenration wages than Females and Coloureds 
ha,'e higher resenration wages than I\fricans. 
-_ .. _--_._------
31 One will note that the coefficient on the hhold income variable becomes slightly less significant at only the 10% 
level. This may be as a result of correlation between hhold income and the work dummy. Those who have worked 
















The effect of age seems to vary, but in general older people have higher reservation 
wages. As age is not always significant - we cannot be exactly sure what the link is 
between age and rescnyation wages. It may proxy to an extent for life or work 
experience with older people thinking they can offer more to a job and as a result 
expecting to be remunerated better. In addition or alternatively, older people may 
\vant to be remunerated better in order to maximise on their final years in the labour 
force. 
"\n important fmding is that any form of post-school education leads to a sudden 
increase in a person's reservation wage even if they ha,'e had little or no schooling. 
A person's resen-ation wage varies according to his/her labour market 
classification, with those in wage-employment leaning more towards a perceived 
labour market value reservation wage and those who are unemployed more towards 
a subsistence reservation wage. In addition, as people become more discouraged 
about their job prospects, their reservation wage declines. 
Disaggregating household income to isolate the separate effects of wage, sclf-
employment, casual-employment, grant and remittance income on the resenyation 
wages of the unemployed showed no significant results. 
Although duration of unemployment is not linked to labour market classification 
of the unemplo:"cd, there is evidence that as duration of unemployment lengthens 
(up to a point), ,0 the resenTation wage declincs. Bcyond this point, people have 
been unemployed for so long tl1at thc reservation wage they report is probably 
random and meaningless. 
• Finally, a person's reservation wage varies according to his/her background 
(urban/ rural) only because a higher proportion of Africans are from rural areas and 
most of the Coloureds from urban areas. 
Now that we know the unemployed have the lowest resen-ation wage - one may wonder 
\vhy it is that they are unemployed? Are they voluntarily choosing to remain unemployed due 











they are too expensiye relatiye to the wage they could command in the workplace and 
relati,'e to those who are in wage-employment? In order to answer these questions, section 6 
will look at a respondent's reservation wage in relation to their predicted wage. As discussed 
in section 3, Kingdon and Knight (2001) use a sinlllar technique in trying to assess whether 











6. Reservation and Predicted Wages 
The flrst step is to geneute a predicted wage for all respondents. From this, the ratio of 
reservation wage divided by predicted wage (RW /PW') is calculated (for all respondents who 
reported a reservation w'lge) to assess which groups of people ha,'e unrealistic wage 
expectations. Unrealistic wage expectations are ''lhere the ratio of R\'V /P\'V is greater than 
one meaning a higher re'ier'lation wage than predicted wage. To better understand which 
groups of people are mc)st likely to have unrealistic ''lage expectations, an ordinal variable is 
created. Respondents arc then given the value 1 if their ratio RW /PW is greater than 1 or the 
,'alue 0 if their ratio RW /PW is less than or equal to 1. Using probit analysis an assessment is 
made to see which groups of people have the highest chance of haying a RW /PW ratio of 
greater than 1. The methodology is discussed briefly in section 6.1 followed by a 
presentation of the results in section 6.2. 
6.1 Methodology 
The same monthly after-tax wage that was calculated in section 4.3.1 for those in wage-
employment is used. Non-labour force participants are rejected from this analysis. All those 
in self/casual-employment, searching/network-searching and marginalised unemployment 
are gi\-en a monthly after-tax wage equal to O. If OLS regression were used to fit an earnings 
function for current wage earners and the fitted parameters used to predict what the 
unemployed would eam if they were employed this would lead to sample selection bias. In 
this case the OLS estimator is both biased and inconsistent (Breen, 1996). To reduce this 
selecti\'ity bias, the Heckman maximum likelihood method of estimation is used to generate 
the respondents' predicted wage32• The maximum likelihood method is preferred to the 
Heckman two-step approach as the estimates are more efficient than the two-stage estimator 
and are asymptotically unbiased given a large enough sample (Breen, 1996). In this case the 
sample (N = 1935) is large enough. 
Initially a probit model is run to explain which respondents would be employed given certain 
characteristics. The explanatory variables that \\Till determine the probability of a person 
3: The Heckman maximum Iii-;elihood method was used instead of a standard Tobit as different explanatory variables 
could be used at the selection and outcome stage. A weakness of the standard Tobit model is that the same set of 
variables is held to determine both the probability of truncation and the expected value of the real ised dependant 











being selected into wage-employment are age, gender, education level, household status]3 and 
the number of other employed people in the household as shown in table 13. The use of 
networks is the mam way people find jobs in I~\IP (Seekings, 2003). Number of other 
employed people in the household will increase the size of a person's network and improve 
their chances of finding employment. Surprisingly, race is not significant in influencing a 
person's probability of getting into wage-employment, however, as shown in the outcome 
stage it is significant in determining variation in wages. 




N umbers in II arc the standard CHor 
• Sig11lficant at the 10% level 
** Sit-.'11ificant at the 5% level 
Sig11lficant at the 1 % level 
11 Either head of the househok or not. 












Once the likelihood function is specified, the process seeks to fmd a set of parameters that 
maximises the likelihood function and explains the predicted wage of each respondent. The 
explanatory variables, age and education34, chosen for the outcome stage, confirm with a 
T\1incerean earnings function (see Chamberlain & Van del' Berg (2002) for a complete 
discussion). Age being used to proxy for work experience gi\Oen the discussion earlier on the 
difficulties in measuring work experience in l(:l\IP. Finally, gender and race discrimination 
exist in the IZMP labour market and are included as explanatory ,oariables. A likelihood ratio 
test produced a chi-squared statistic of 3.94. Thus, at the 5% level one is able to reject the 
hypothesis that the selection and outcome stages are independent. This supports the use of 
the Heckman approach 111 generating the predicted wage. Predicted wages were generated 
for all respondents (using the model in table 13) including those presently in wage-
employment. The predicted wages were adjusted by the im'erse mills ratio Oambda), to 
account for the probability of the person getting the job. As shown in table 13 the variable 
lambda is included as one of the explanatory variables in the outcome stage and has a 
negative and significant coefficient. 
6.2 Results 
Table 14 shows the mean reservation wage, mean predicted wage, and the calculated 
R\'{/ /PW ratio for selected groups. Across all groups the ratio (RW /p\~') is below one's. The 
fact that RW /PW is below one is evidence that people in l(:l\fP are realistic in their wage 
expectations gi,-en what they could expect to earn in employment. 
34 Age-squared and education-squared were also included but showed no significance. 











TABLE 14: i'dean Resenation Wage (RW) and Predicted Wage (P\X') 
I RW PW Ratio (RW /PW) 
I Gende< Female 1O-l6 1153 0.91 
Male 1267 1649 0.77 
IRace African 1033 1245 0.83 
i Coloured 1.t16 1701 0.83 
Education 0-5 1023 1090 0.94 
0-5+ 135..t. 1327 1.02 
6-9 1077 1388 0.78 
6-9+ 1327 1615 0.82 
Matrie 1209 1589 0.76 
Matric+ 1533 1826 0.84 
University 1490 2013 0.74 
Age Young «=30) 1078 1360 0.79 
Old (> :30) 1189 1371 0.87 
Work Experience Worked 1208 1.t31 0.84 
Never \\forked 963 1196 0.81 
Background Rural 1013 1235 0.82 
Urban 1262 1507 0.84 
Labour Market Status \X!age-emp 1319 1514 0.87 
Self-emp 1214 1241 0.98 
Casual-emp 102..t. 1301 0.79 
I 
I Searching-unemp 1066 13..t.O 0.80 
Network Seareh-unemp 957 1267 0.76 




Duration of Unemployment 1149 1380 0.83 
6-12 957 1296 0.74 
12-24 93..t. 1295 0.72 
.24-48 991 1267 0.78 
48-96 926 1211 0.76 
i 
>96 1096 1189 0.92 
IWork Experience Worked before 1060 C 1335 0.79 
i 
Never Worked 936 1211 0.77 
To make a case for voluntary unemployment the ratio for those in unemployment would 
ha,-e to be one or above. The ratios for those in different labour market classifications show 
that this is far from the case. As people become more discouraged their ratio drops with 
those who are marginalised and network-searching having ratios of only 0.78 and 0.76 






















desperation to fInd employment. Even the unemployed who ha,re neyer worked have a 
mean resenration wage ,,,'ell below their mean predicted wage. 
Looking at duration of unemployment, the results support the desperation of the 
unemployed to fInd work. As duration of unemployment lengthens beyond 6 months, so the 
ratio falls from 0.83 to around 0.75. Those who ha,'e been unemployed for more than 8 
years have a higher mean reservation wage as a group but also the lowest mean predicted 
wage. As a result the rati·) moves up to about 0.92. This supports the proposition that 
people lose their sense of market value after long spells of unemployment. 
In general the ratio RW / PW falls as education increases. Firstly, this indicates that those 
with little education have reservation wages that are possibly too high, especially the 0-5+ 
category. Secondly, it indicates that the better educated are being extremely well remunerated 
(high predicted wages) those with university qualifIcations having the lowest ratio of all 
categories at 0.74. The mean predicted wage of the different education categories supports 
the 'comrex returns to education in South Africa' hypothesis. Those with some form of post-
school education have a far higher mean predicted wage than those with no post-school 
education bur comparable schooling (i.e. 0-5 ha\re a mean PW of R1090, whereas 0-5+ have 
a mean PW of R1327).However, as noted in section 5, these groups are possibly aware of 
this return and have higher resenration wages. The ratio of RW IPW supports this with each 
category of post-school education having a higher ratio than those with comparable 
schooling but no post-school education. 
Of all the respondents, 28% had a resenration wage above their predicted wage. Probit 
analysis is used to understand what groups of people are most likely to be a part of this 28%. 
Table 15 shows the results for four different probit models. As discussed the dependant 
variable is ordinal, where 1 indicates that the respondent has a resen'atlon wage higher than 
their predicted wage (i.e. group-i) and 0 indicates that the respondent has a reselTation wage 
equal to or less than their predicted wage (i.e. group-O) 36. 
36 The coefficients on 'age' and 'educ' indicate the change in the probability of being in group-l for an infinitesimal 
change in the variable, extrapolated out (Stata Corporation, 2003). The rest of the variables arc dummy variables and 
the coefficients indicate the change lD the probability of being in group-I given the dummy variable is opposite from 











'L\BLE 15:Probit Analysis 
Dependant Variable: (1 if RW/PW> 1) & (0 ifRW/~W<-I) 
1 2 3 
Intercept 0.029 i 0.126** 0.131* 
m 1-00581 .. JOO-lIl 10.068, 
Age -0.001 0.001 -0.001 
10.0011 100011 10.0011 
,Gender -0.118*** -0.114*** I -0.128*** 
10.0231 10.0221 10.022 1 
I Race 0.001 -0.004 0.002 
10.0311 10.0311 10.0311 
. Education -0.028*** -0.030*** 
10.0041 10.0041 
I Urban 0.046* 0.037 0.050* 
10.0271 10.0271 10.0271 
I Work 0.065** 0.053** 0.045 















t Casual-emp -0.100* 
10.051 
I Scarching-unemp -0.047 
I 10.031 
'Network Search-unemp -0.110** 
i 10.0331 ._--
I Marginalised-unemp -0.106*** 
10.031 
iUncmp bto.v6-12 months 
I Unemp bto.v 12-24 months 
!Unemp btw 24-48 months 
IUnemp bto.v 48-96 months 
i 
:t:nemp greater th, 8 years 
l\i 1714 1714 1714 
[Log! -958.39 -963.75 -9·15.06 
,LR chi2 94.90 84.18 121.55 
Iprob>chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Kotes 
Probit 4 includes only those wh,. arc classified in one of the unemployment categories 
Number, in II arc the standard ("rror 
< Significant at the 10% level 
" Sih'11ificant at the 5% levd 


















































Looking at probit 1, the coefficients on age and race are completely insignificant. From this 
result one can comment that the reason for a greater percentage of younger and African 
people being unemployed is not as a result of them haying too high a reservation wage 
relati,'e to what they could expect to earn. 
The work variable may shmv significance in probit 1, but as soon as labour market status is 
introduced in probit 3 it loses its significance. The \vork' variable shows no significance in 
probit 43; supporting the evidence from table 14, where those unemployed who have never 
worked have a similar R\V!PW ratio to those who have worked before. 
The gender \'ariable is h1ghly significant in all of the probit's indicating that males have 
about a 12% less chance of being in group_1 3B • Although one may argue that the higher 
proportion of women in unemployment in KJvlP is as a result of females having wage 
aspirations too high relatlve to what they could expect to earn in employment, table 14 
shows that this is not the case. In table 14 the ratio of RW!PW for women is below 1. The 
gender bias in the KJ\lP Jabour market, with males being paid more than females for similar 
jobs, is the reason why the chances of males being in group-l is less than that of females. 
The coefficient for education is highly significant, indicating that the chances of a person 
falling in group-l declines as they become more educated. For low le"els of education there 
may be a case that people have wage aspirations too high relati,'e to what they could expect 
to earn. However, in general the explanation of the education coefficient is as a result of the 
,'ery high remuneration of those with more education - remuneration well beyond their 
resen-arion wages. Probit 2 supports this, indicating that those with a university qualification 
haye a 23% less chance of being in group-1 compared to those with an education leyel of 
onlv zero to standard 5. 
The results in probits 3 and 4 support those from table 14. Voluntary unemployment does 
not exist in I<-t\IP. Those who are network searching or marginally unemployed have an 11 % 
less chance of being in group-l and those who have been unemployed for longer than 6 
months ha,'c about a 12<% less chance of being in group-i. These results are due to the 
extremely low resen'ati(;n wages of these groups resen'ation wages driven by their 
desperation to fInd work. 
37 Even when duration of unemployment is left out 











The results in this section indicate that unemployment is definitely not voluntary, as people's 
reservation wages are realistic given what they could expect to earn in the labour market. The 
reservation wages of those who are unemployed (less educated, predominantly females and 
African) fall below their predicted wages. This substantiates other findings about the South 
African labour market (Bhorat & Hodge (1999), Bhorat (2000a), Edwards (2001), Fallon & 













In a country where unemployment is low, and where there are a sufficient number of job 
\'acancies, know'ing the determinants of reservation wages may be useful for explaining 
whether relati\'ely high reservation wages are reducing the supply of labour. However, in 
South Africa the problem in the labour market is rather inadequate demand for unskilled 
labour. In an area like I<:};[P, where 46% of the economically active respondents are 
classified as searching, network-searching or marginalised unemployed, this amounts to a 
substantial portion of the population. With this in mind one may \vonder what use 
reservation wage in forma ,ion can be. 
\'Vhen presented with hypothetical job offers, as discussed in section 4, certain respondents 
refused jobs. This is significant (given the high levels off unemployment) as it signals that 
some people are not willing to accept a job at any wage. In light of this, knowing the 
determinants of reservation wages in KJvfP increases the understanding of labour supply - in 
particular \vhich groups of people would be prepared to \vork at different wage rates. 
"\n important fmding of this paper is that a person's reservation wage is influenced strongly 
by his/her labour market status. There is no evidence that labour market status is a function 
of resen'ation \vages (i.e. the unemployed do not have excessi,'e or unrealistic wage 
aspirations). It was argued that the employed report a resen'ation wage based more on their 
perceived labour market "alue and the unemployed report a reservation wage influenced 
strongly by subsistence requirements. 
The paper showed that there is no evidence that ci1e unemployed are out of \vork due to 
excessive wage aspirations, in relation to the wage they could command in employment. 
Section 6 shows that thme who are deeper in unemployment (i.e. more discouraged) have 
the lowest RW /P\'V ratio and are least likely to have a resen'ation wage above their predicted 
wage. In addition, as unemployment lengthens beyond 6 months, the RW /PW ratio falls 
accordingly. This indicates that people are responding rationally to the adverse labour market 
conditions. Unemployment is a result of the low availability of jobs for unskilled people 











It is accepted that there is a shortage of skills in the economy and improving the skill level is 
advantageous, but generating a more skilled workforce takes time. One way to create jobs 
for those with low skills, especially in K;'v1P, is through Public Works Programmes19 (P\'Vl)s). 
At present, the primary aim of a PWP in South Africa is to alle,'iate poverty (see l\fcCord, 
2002). A key determinant of the targeting success of such a programme (i.e. employing those 
from the poorest househc1lds) is setting the P\VP wage at the correct level. If the wage is set 
too high then the PWP may attract people who are better off and already have jobs, leaving 
the poorest people without work. As a result many of the people in deepest pm'erty may not 
have their liyes improved from the PWP (see Rayallion, Datt & Chaudhuri (1991) for 
e\'idence of this). On the l)ther hand if the wage is set too low this may be morally 
problematic. However, if policy makers have a better understancling of reservation wages 
amongst clifferent inclividuals, they may be able to set a wage rate, where only workers from 
the poorest households are attracted, and thus the poyerty alle,'iation impact will be at its 
best. 
Table 16"''' shows a list of PWPs in the Western Cape between 1994 and 1998 (Adato et aI, 
1999). It is unclear whether the work offered by these PWPs is casual or permanent 
employment. As cliscusseJ in section 3 and 4, people ha,'e a higher reservation wage for 
casual work than for permanent work. Section 4 shows the mean reservation wage for casual 
work to be about double that of permanent work.41 This should be taken into account when 
comparing the wage offered by P\VPs and mean reservation wages. The numbers in 
brackets, in the bottom half of table 16, are the mean reservation wages multiplied by 2. 
Ideally these PWP wages should be compared with reservation wages of people in the 
catchment area of the relevant PWP. However, in the absence of adequate data, the KMP 
sun'ey is the best a,'ailable proxy for comparison. 
39 McCord (2002) offers a good overview of PWP and their poverty alleviation response. 
40 The top half of the table shovys the PWP and the monthly wage offered. The information for the wage offered is 
taken from Adato et al (1999). In working out the monthly wage offered, the percentage of costs going to labour per 
day were converted to a monthly wage offer by multiplying the daily rate by 21.75. These monthly offers were then 
converted to 2000 figures using the CPI for metropolitan areas (South African Reserve Bank, 200 I). 1996 was assumed 
to be the year of the PWP. The bottom half shows the mean reservation wage of different labour market groups. 
41 Table 2 shows the mean reser ,ation wage for casual work (question 15) to be R2319 and the mean reservation wage 











Table 16: Wagesin PWPs compared to mean Reservation Wages 
,Programme 
T 
Monthly Wage Offered (rands) 
7306 I ransport - I 
Comm-Based P\\'P 1229 
: Cleaning and Greening 1111 
IWCEDF-NEForum 924 
, 
'PILOT-Nat Dept PW 833 
i 
, 
iF\VCP-Working for \'I/ater 817 
iComm-Based P\\1)-CEP /1 600 i 
rLabour Market Group Mean Reservation W~-g-e-(r-an-d-S~)--J 
il-\x-.a-g-e--e-.m-p -------------+----·- l355 (2710) 
jSearching-unemp 1066 (2132) 
Self-emp 121-+ (2428) -_ .._------' 
.Casual-cmp 1024 (2048) 
Network Search-unemp 957 (1914) 
i'>farginalised-uncmp 944 (1888) 
N on-labour force participallts _____ L __ ~ ___ 12_-_i 2_(2_5_4_4_) _____ ----' 
Not~ 
Number:, in bracket:' are the rc,cvatlon wages multiplied by 2. 
If we assume the PW1) i~ a permanent job, then the 'Transport' P\\1P has a wage-offer higher 
than the mean reselTation wage of both the wage-employed and the self-employed. A wage-
offer this high may well distort the targeting effectiveness of the P\Xrp (in trying to alleviate 
poverty amongst the unemployed) as those in wage-employment and self-employment may 
be attracted to the 'Transport' PWP. Only the four P\XlPs offering the lowest wages will be 
effective in targeting those who are unemployed and in most need of a job. Hmvever, a wage 
of R600/month for the 'Comm-Based PWP-CEP /1' programme is well below the 
reservation wage of even the marginalised unemployed_ 
If we assume the PWP is a casual job, the story is quite different. No PWP would attract 
people in wage-employment or self-employment as the wages offered arc below the 
resen-ation wages of the wage-employed and self-employed for casual jobs (i.e. numbers in 
brackets). The 'Transport' PWP offering an adjusted monthly wage of R2306 would possibly 
attract people in casual-employment. All other P\X'Ps would attract only unemployed people. 
Hmvcycr, the wages offered in all P\v'Ps, besides the 'Transport' P\'(.'P, are well below the 











"\s shown, in judging the targeting success of a P\X'P it is important to know whether 
permanent or casual-employment is being offered, as people have different reservation 
wages for permanent and casual-employment. Reservation wage information for different 
labour market groups in J<J\fP could help policy makers better structure the wage offer of 
future P\vPs for the Kl\IP area. For example, in targeting those who are marginalised 
uncmployed and come from the poorest households, a monthly wage of about R950 should 
be offered, assuming the PWP is offering a permanent position. 
The results in this paper show that those willing to accept the lowest wages are those with 
the least education and labour market experience and who come from households with no 
other wagc earners. Hence, it is not necessarily in thc interests of business to try and target 
thosc workcrs with thc lowest reservation wages, in order to reducc labour costs. Haying 
minimal experience of the labour markct these peoplc may havc little idea of what it means 
to be at work on time or how the workday is structured and as a result will ahnost certainly 
be less producti,'c. 
From a policy pcrspective the results of this paper havc relevance in three areas: education, 
measures of pm"erty and Imvering wages to reduce unemployment: 
• Section 6 shows evidence of the premium attached to a person's predicted wage as a 
result of post-school training. This prcmium is as a rcsult of the prcsent shortagc of 
skilled labour. Howc\'cr, as thc skill base is extendcd and reservation wages rise, the ratio 
(RW /P\v,) may rise above 1 (section 5 shows how post-school education causes a 
sudden increase in re~ervation wages) and labour costs will increase. \\1ith this in mind, 
technical training or courses for the unemployed must be carefully prepared so that they 
equip the participants with sufficient knowledge/expertise/productivity changes to 
match the increascd reservation wage or labour cost. Participants on such courses should 
also be giycn information about possible jobs and wages - in order to prevent them 
deyeloping unrealistically high reservation wages. 
• Perhaps greater focu;; should fall on the expansion of primary and secondary schooling, 
instead of tertiary leycl education, as reservation wages do not increase drastically for 
each standard completed. Primary and secondary schooling broadens the base of people 











workers with lower re~ervation wages but with greater potential to benefit from on the 
job training. Employers will be able to equip workers with job specific skills that can be 
directly rewarded maintaining a cost/productivity balance. 
• The results in section 5 show a tendency for unemployed people to take subsistence 
requirements into account when reporting their reserYation wage. The mean reservation 
wage for unemployed people in I<JVIP is about RIOOO per month, which may in fact be a 
further and more accurate measure of a subjective poverty line. In future surveys, greater 
effort must be made [it the level of survey design to distinguish adequately between those 
who report reservation wages as subsistence reservation wages (i.e. take household 
income into account) and those who just report their percei"ed labour market value. 
This paper has highlighted the fact that wage earners probably do not omit their 
contribution to household income when reporting their reservation wage. 
• The problem of adyerse selection exists in labour contracts where the employer cannot 
completely distinguish between the productivity of a group of prospective employees. 
One way to ensure that more productive employees are attracted, hired and retained is to 
offer higher wages or what are termed efficiency wages. A recent article by Fedderke 
(2003) suggests that dropping wages in South Africa will reduce unemployment. 
E,·idence from this paper both supports and cautions Fedderke's reasoning in light of 
adverse selection. In mpporting Fedderke's argument, section 6 shows how low the 
RW /PW ratio is for different groups of workers in I~\IP, but especially those with better 
qualifications. There is thus room for employers to reduce wages and still attract, hire 
and retain productive workers. In turn, lowering wages will possibly allow employers to 
hire greater numbers of workers helping ease unemployment as argued by Fedderke 
(2003). In cautioning Fedderke's (2003) argument, it must be noted that different 
categories of labour haye different reservation wages. If wages are dropped substantially 
then only those who are poorly educated and marginalised unemployed (i.e. less 
productive) will be attracted to work and those who haye better education and 
experience will withdraw from the labour force. In this instance the unemployment rate 
may fall as less productive workers take jobs and more productive workers withdraw 
from the labour force. However, this fall in unemployment may not be permanent. On 
one hand, the average productivity of labour will have declined, leading to a drop in 











workers stay out of the labour force (duration without work increases) so will their 
resen'ation wage decline, as their human capital depreciates. At some point their 
resen'ation wage will ralliow cnough and they will rc-enter the labour market as less 
producti\Te \vorkers. On re-entering the labour market 
111crease once morc. 
unemployment rate \vill 
Gi\'en the limited knowledge of rescrvation wages, qualitative research is necessary to better 
understand what people think when asked about their reservation wage. J-\ complete 
understanding of how res,,~rvation wages change m'er time, how people re-evaluate 
themsekes and the rate of this re-evaluation, will only be possible when panel data exists. 
The present minimum wage legislation and changes to the legislation will impact on a 
person's resen'ation wage especially if it falls below the minimum wage. \V'hen panel data 
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Appendix A: Histogram of Reservation Wages and Treatment of Outliers 
o -
o 2000 4000 6000 8000 
K.S. What is the absolute lowest monthly take home wage ~u would work for? 
Four respondents reported a reservation wage of above R6500 per month. These responses 
are more than two standard deviations above the mean reservation wage of R 1159 per 
month and were investigated more carefully to consider whether they were outliers and in 
need of adjustment. Of these four responses, two were for respondents who are classified as 
being in wage-employment, reporting a monthly wage of R600 and R5500, well below their 
reported reservation wages of R8000 and R9500 respectively. Both these observations were 
coded as missing as they ~re well above what the respondent is presently earning and are 
taken to be recording errors. A further respondent, classified as being marginalised 
unemployed, reported a reservation wage of R8000, well above the wage of R 736 earned by 
this person in their fust and only job in 1996. Accordingly, this observation was coded as 
missing as it is also taken to be a recording error. The fourth response of R 7000 is the 
reported reservation wage of a school-going 21 year old. It was decided not to code this 
observation as missing as R7000 may be the person's reservation wage to drop out of school 
and forgo completing matric. Setting the three observations to missing reduces the mean and 
standard deviation only slightly as shown in the table below. 
Mean and standard deviation before and after adjusting for three extreme outliers42 
Obs. Mean Standard Deviation 
Before 2267 1159 798 
After 2264 1149 752 











Appendix B: Explanatory Variables Not Used 
The following variables were not used in the analysis in this paper but could be used in a 
national sample. 
Rural/Urban area of residence may be an important factor in explaining variation in 
reservation wages if respondents come from both rural and urban areas. In this study all 
people lived in the KMP area and were classified as urban dwellers. 
In an area of high unemployment, one would expect people to have lower reservation wages 
than in an area of low unemployment, as the probability of finding work is lower. The local 
unemployment rate subtr;lcted from one would be a gOOll proxy for the probability of 
finding a job in a certain area. It would be useful to test the relationship between 
reservation wages and the local unemployment rate for areas that have differences in 
unemployment, but within I<lvIP people face the same unemployment rate. 
When looking at what determines an individual's reservation wage, the type of job and 
industry should be taken into account. There are two reasons why this is not taken into 
account in this study. The first is that no industry specific reservation wage information was 
asked of the respondents. The KMP survey was undertaken in an area of very high 
unemployment (according to the labour market classifications adopted, 46% of the 
economically active43 respondents were classified as either searching, network-searching or 
marginalised unemployed) with the purpose of probing the minimum wage that a 
respondent would accept for 'any job'. The expectation is that respondents are so desperate 
for work, given the high levels of unemployment that they will accept whatever job is 
offered. The second reason is that this paper seeks to understand what impacts on a person's 
reservation wage in an area of high unemployment before any specific job offers are 
evaluated. 
Factors like distance to work and working conditions would be important in determining 
a person's reservation wage if he/she were presently working44 or had received a specific job 
offer. As we are interested in reservation wages prior to any offers having been received 
these factors are not considered. 
Another factor considerd are the costs of job search. According to the value functions 
described in section 2,if the costs of search go up then the value of being searching 
unemployed will fall . If this value falls then the value of employment (a wage offer) need not 
be as high in order to induce a person to take the job. Thus one would expect a negative 
relationship between costs of search and a person's reservation wage. If more specific 
questions had been asked in the KlvfP survey this would be an interesting relationship to 
test. However, only a question relating to the costs of travel was asked and very little 
variation in response was recorded (the mean being R25 per month with a standard 
deviation of RIB). In addition, it is believed tlnt non-work income available to the 
respondent is more important as an explanatory variable than the cost of search in 
explaining variation in reservation wages - especially if we assume that tl1e costs of job 
search are the same for people in KMP. The expense of job search is then relative to the 
amount of non-wage income a person can rely on. If their non-wage income is high, then 
their costs of search will be relatively lower, than people with less non-wage income. Thus, 
43 Here, economically active does not include those classified as non-labour force participants. 












as non-wage income is increased, costs of search will fall and the reservation wage will rise. 
Here, the reservation wage is positively related to non-wage income. This relationship is 
tested using data from the KMP survey. 
A further factor that was considered in determining an individual's reservation wage is union 
membership. Mention of unions in the KlvfP questionnaire is only in question E19, which 
measures the deductions from a pay slip of a person in wage-employment. The mean 
reservation wage of those who indicated that they had union fees deducted from their 
payslip is R 1521, which is substantially different from the mean of the sample as a whole of 
Rl166 (table 10). However, this difference is better explained by the fact that all of these 
respondents who reported fees deducted from their pays lip have answered section E, dealing 
with wage-employment, and are classified as being in wage-employment. The regression 
analysis will show that those in wage-employment have a significantly higher reservation 
wage as a group. 
Non-wage income also includes household savings that a household member is able to 
draw on. In trying to assess the effect of household savings on a respondent's reservation 
wage, it is only possible to see if there is a difference between those people who are currently 
showing some form of savings activity (stokvel, burial society, bank or other) from those 
who are not. In the KMP survey, respondents were asked to indicate the amount of money 
they give to a stokvel or burial society and the amount of money saved in the bank or other 
savings every month. The questions asked shed no light on the accumulated savings that a 
person is able to draw on. It would be incorrect to assume that just because a person is 
saving a high amount per month now, that they have a good savings base on which to draw. 
The best we can do is to assess if there is any difference between the reservation wages of 
those who show savings activity and those who do not. Of the Kl\IP respondents, just under 
half (47%) indicated some form of monthly saving activity. As can be seen in table 10, there 
is a difference in mean reservation wages between the two groups. Those who save have a 
higher mean reservation wage (R1223) than those who do not currently save (RI076). This 
result was tested in various regression models and found to be insignificant regardless of the 
specification of the model. Often the signs were different from what was expected. 
Household Size and number of children less than 16 in the household were considered 
in determining an individual's reservation wage but no clear relationship was found, from 











Appendix C: Summary Statistics of Categorical Explanatory Variables (%breakdown) 
Breakdown % 
Gender Male 43 
Female 57 
Race African 72 
Coloured 28 
Marital Status Married 41 
Unmarried 59 
Place of Birth Rural 51 
Urban 49 




Network Search-unemp 8 
Marginalised-unemp 16 
Non-labour force participants 6 
Work Experience \'(/orked before 71 
Never Worked 29 
Expectations on getting a Job Very Positive 40 
Positive 25 
Neither Pos nor Dis 11 
Disheartened 10 
Very Disheartened 14 
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